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The Impact o f Foreign Aid on National Development: 
A Case Study of Bangladesh
This study is concerned with the impaet o f foreign aid on development in third world 
countries. It focuses particularly on the negative impact o f aid on recipient countries in a 
ease study of Bangladesh. The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is a part o f aid 
conditionalities and here in this study I trace out the socio-economic impact o f the SAP. 
I review two schools o f thought; one that is supportive o f aid arguing that aid is a catalyst 
or driving force for development, and another decidedly critical school that argues that 
foreign aid is  no t a c atalyst f o r d  evelopment b u t r  ather as a catalyst fo r a ccumulating 
resources from developing countries and creating a market for the developed world. In 
this connection I review considerable evidence that suggest that foreign aid is dietated by 
political and strategic considerations much more than by the eeonomie needs and poliey 
performance o f the recipients. The thesis o f this study is that foreign aid, rather than 
being a means to economic and social development, has largely become a means by 
which most o f the developing countries are being exploited. Bangladesh since its 






The relationship between foreign aid and development dates back to the post-World War 
II era when a majority o f the European states found themselves economically, morally, 
and physically devastated. Since then, many forms of foreign aid-multilateral, bilateral, 
private-investment, food-aid, emergency-aid, for example—have been given to foster 
reconstruction in many different nations. After the European nations recovered, foreign 
aid no longer went to promote reconstruction, but rather focused on fostering 
development. The struggle between communism and capitalism not only fueled but also 
encouraged the use of foreign aid as a foreign policy. Literature on foreign aid and its 
relationship to the promotion of development in undeveloped nations published during 
the Cold War displays a democratic slant on development. Many believed that the answer 
to development was in the adoption o f economic, social and political policies embracing 
democratic ideals. But why has foreign aid helped some countries to develop, while 
others find themselves worse off than before the aid was accepted? In some cases, foreign 
aid has not only failed to address the poverty but also increased the poverty situations. 
Corruption, unproductive consumption and increasing the gap between rich and poor are 
the consequences of foreign aid in most o f the third world countries. For instance, since 
independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s external aid has exceeded $30 billion. Development 
economists and aid watchers contend that this aid has had no visible impact on the 
economic and social development o f the country and the benefits o f this aid did not reach 
the poor constituting the vast majority o f the population of Bangladesh. Most o f it was
sucked up by influential interest groups creating in the process a new elite class and 
hundreds of import-export agencies and consultancy firms. In Africa, after two decades 
o f development planning financed largely by the IMF and World Bank, sub-Saharan 
Africa today has a lower per-capital income than it did when the aid started. However, 
the reasons for such a situation may lie in many factors—the status of the country prior to 
receiving foreign aid, the motives behind foreign aid, the donor/recipient relationship, the 
definition of development, the type of foreign aid given, and the proposed policies and 
conditionalities of foreign aid. But we have evidence that the conditional foreign aid, for 
example, the aid under structural adjustment policy reforms has a devastating effect on 
the recipient. There are other factors, which are related to the failure o f foreign aid in the 
context of Bangladesh particularly. For instance, good governance, aid allocation, types 
of aid and the political and strategic interest of the vested interest groups both in donors 
and recipients side. In this study I emphasis more on the type o f foreign aid, which has 
been given based on the structural adjustment policy reforms and the effects o f these 
policies. Since the formal introduction of structural adjustment programme in the 1980s 
its missions and goals have not only failed but also badly affected the poor. In the 
following sections 1 like to discuss about different types of foreign aid and structural 
adjustment programme for better understanding before going to the main discussion of 
this study.
Foreign Aid
The general idea behind foreign aid is “the benevolent donation of funds by rich nations 
to poor nations so that the poor nation can sufficiently meet the needs o f its people” (Hoy
1998, 3). Morgenthau defines foreign aid as a transfer of money, goods and services from 
one country to another (Morgenthau 1962, 301). A more technical definition is provided 
by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which cites official terminology of 
foreign aid as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Three requirements must be met 
in order for aid (ODA) to be determined, as explained by Robert Cassen. The first 
concession states that aid must he distributed by official agencies to another official 
agencies; an “official agency” is an organization that has some affiliation with a state’s 
government, whether the organization is the actual government or an NGO supported by 
several governments. The money given to countries by MNC’s or by private donors is not 
considered ODA. Second, the aid given must be given with the intention o f promoting 
economic development and welfare in the recipient nation. Lastly, 25% of the money 
transferred must be in the form of a grant—the money does not have to be paid back to 
the donor nation (Cassen 1986, 2).
According to this official definition of foreign assistance, money given to promote 
military expansion in a nation is not considered foreign aid because the intention is 
clearly not to promote economic growth or the welfare o f a state, but quite obviously to 
ensure the security o f the recipient state. Aid strictly seeks long-term development as its 
main goal, so therefore food aid and emergency aid should not be considered ODA; 
however, these two forms of aid are included in the DAC’s definition o f foreign 
assistance (Cassen 1986, 2). Foreign assistance varies both by the type o f aid given, and 
by the profile of the donor. Bilateral assistance is one-on-one aid: one donor directs funds 
to one recipient, where the most common donors are governments. Multilateral assistance
is less individualistic: a global or world agency deals directly with a recipient government 
or a group of governments (Singer 1982, 164). Most often, the donor is an agency in the 
UN or an NGO. While not all types of aid fit into one category or another and 
intermediate forms of both exist, there exists a strong debate over which type o f aid is 
more effective. A popular form of aid combines the two—bilateral assistance is given in 
a multilateral framework (Singer 1982, 165). Individual governments gather together 
with the recipient nation to analyze studies of the nation’s development progress (most 
often prepared by the World Bank and the nation itself). In this forum the goals o f the 
recipient are established, and each government determines independently the amount of 
aid and in what form they are going to offer to the recipient (Singer 1982, 165). So, 
theoretically, foreign aid is given for different development objectives to the recipients. 
In the following section 1 will discuss different types of development aid and what type 
of aid 1 am looking for in my thesis.
Types of Foreign Aid
Aid is given to promote many different objectives, and therefore exists in many different 
forms. In 1962, at the height o f the Cold War, Hans Morgenthau used political notions to 
explain the phenomenon of foreign aid, and determined there to be six distinguishable 
types of aid: humanitarian, subsistence, military, bribery, prestige, and aid for eeonomie 
development (Morgenthau 1962, 301). The only non-political type o f foreign aid is 
humanitarian aid that is given to countries during times o f flood, famine, epidemics, or 
other crises. Aid given in this manner seeks to solve short-term problems with large
infusions o f capital. Subsistence foreign aid is given to governments who do not possess 
the resources to provide its people with fundamental public policies and programmes. 
The goal o f subsistence aid is to maintain the status quo, and prevent social unrest by the 
citizens against the government (Morgenthau 1962, 302). Bribery, in the traditional 
sense, was a means o f diplomacy where an ambassador would offer money to another 
leader to ensure the carrying out of a policy, an alliance in war, or assurance o f certain 
trade proceedings. The modem form of bribery is perhaps more normative yet 
nonetheless exploitive because it continues to alienate one country over another. While 
foreign aid seeks to promote political alliances between two countries it can also deter 
relations between the donor and the non-recipients.
Another type of foreign aid is prestige aid, which is the donation o f modem technology to 
undeveloped nations in the hope of spurring industrialization and economic 
development— it is strictly to increase the apparent image of the recipient and the donor 
at t he s ame t ime. T his f  orm o f  aid requires t he least c ommitment o f r  esources b y t h e  
donor, and therefore is the cheapest type of foreign aid (Morgenthau 1962, 304).
Military foreign aid dates as far back as the Roman Empire when money was given to a 
country to assure an alliance. Morgenthau cites the difference between bribery and 
military foreign aid, as “military aid requires the recipient to supply manpower while the 
recipient provides money and materials”. Military aid looks to stabilize allied 
govemments facing domestic or even intemational opposition, or to ensure a political 
alliance in  the intemational system (Hoy 1998, 21). During the Cold W ar, the United
States and the USSR offered most of foreign aid in the form of military aid to ensure non- 
alliance with the other superpower.
The basic f  orm of foreign a ssistance is strictly g iven to f  oster e conomic development, 
which can be achieved by instituting industrialization or liberal trade policies in an 
undeveloped nation. Aid may be tied by source, expenditure or both. When aid is given to 
buy a particular item or to be spent on a particular project it may be said to be tied by 
expenditure; when aid is given to be spent on goods and services o f a particular country, 
in most cases the donor country, the aid is said to be tied aid by source (Sobhan and Islam 
1990,117). Programme aid is a form where money is offered towards the economic 
sector o f an undeveloped nation to fix economic problems with the hopes o f fostering 
economic development (Hoy 1998, 162). Often times, programme aid comes with a 
series o f stipulations and terms to which the recipient must comply, and is often times 
referred to as “tied aid” (Singer 1982, 168). The goal o f programme aid is make 
improvements in the recipient nation’s balance of payments (Cassen 1986, 151), which is 
a measure o f the movement of goods, services and capital through a nation’s economy 
(Lairson and Skidmore 1997, 18). The idea that programme aid seeks to target a nation’s 
balance o f payments leads one to believe that the implication o f programme aid is to fund 
some form of economic development. Programme aid is given on conditional terms— a 
country often times must agree to undergo a structural adjustment to receive the loan. The 
goal of the remodeling is to make its economy more efficient and capable o f sustained 
growth (Hoy 1998, 50). Paul Hoy cites Robert Wood’s classification o f the reforms 
instituted as “the four Ds: devalue, decontrol, deflate, and denationalize” (Hoy 1998, 50).
These goals translate into changes in the country’s trade policy, use of resources, 
institutional reforms, and natural resource mobilization (Hoy 1998, 50). Most often, 
money is given to a recipient with the expectation that the funds will be put towards 
purchasing goods o f the donor country. However, the effect of programme aid is 
somewhat indeterminable because the aid does not produce tangible results (Cassen 1986, 
152). For example, as cited by Singer, Great Britain may give programme assistance to a 
country such as India through the establishment o f a credit line designating a certain 
allotment of resources. The effectiveness of programme aid is under debate for this 
reason: Great Britain would most likely only extend this credit line to British resources 
and the money therefore only returns to the pockets of the donor country (Singer 1982, 
169). In addition, programme aid has been cited as unfocused and unaccompanied by an 
appropriate policy framework (Cassen 1986, 154), and requires the recipient country to 
efficiently distribute, maximize and utilize the funds provided. Project aid is form of 
assistance that produces more tangible results, and is often times the result o f multilateral 
assistance given by (but not exclusively) a PVO (private voluntary organization) or NGO 
(non-governmental organization). “Most projects implicitly or explicitly attempt to 
modify the values of their intended beneficiaries, particularly their attitudes toward 
change and their roles of inducing change” (Tisch and Wallace, 40-41). This form of aid 
goes towards short-term development projects, such as the building of a dam or a 
highway, and generally produces substantial results, which makes it an attractive form of 
aid to donors (Hoy 1998, 3). According to Tisch and Wallace, project aid uses three 
strategies to foster development - technology development and transfer, human resource 
development, and policy improvement. There are three broad sectors to which project aid
is directed to bring about advancements in these areas: agriculture and natural resources, 
industry, and services (Tisch and Wallace 1994,41). In the agrieulture and resource 
sector, project aid funding targets the producing, processing, and marketing o f food. 
Money d esignated to the industrial sector is directed towards nonfood c ommodities or 
material goods. And finally, the service area deals with education, health, transportation, 
and communication improvements (Tisch and Wallace 1994, 41).
Technical assistance is another form of foreign aid where experts, advisers, and/or 
equipment are sent to developing countries to educate the local population on 
development strategies and techniques (Hoy 1998, 3). This is more o f an educational 
form of aid rather than an infusion of capital. Professionals are sent to Third World 
countries to inform the p eople about methods o f central banking, balance-of-payments 
accounting, taxation, and other financial methods (Hoy 1 998, 69). This form o f  aid  is  
beneficial only if  the country is capable o f sustainable development—the country must 
have the proper infrastructure to support the needs of the people before they can 
concentrate on improving their governing policies. Food aid is a form of aid whose roots 
are primarily humanitarian and normative. While this type of aid is the least controversial 
(Hoy 1998, 3), studies have shown that the effects o f food aid can be more devastating 
than beneficial to the recipient country. Food aid is most often given to countries facing 
natural disasters that are in need of basic supplies and resources, and goes under the title 
of “emergency assistance” (Lairson and Skidmore 1997, 286). However, famine is not 
always a natural phenomenon— often times countries experiencing famine have 
governmental policies that discouraged local food production, did not put aside proper
reserves, or the result o f civil fighting between domestic factions (Lairson and Skidmore 
1997, 286). Food aid is given according to the methods of programme and projects aid; 
an example o f project aid is “food for work”, as mentioned above, where people o f the 
rural communities are given food rations in return for work. Food aid is given sometimes 
based on a surplus of First World agricultural commodities, not because of 
humanitarianism or altruism (Lairson and Skidmore 1997, 288). Another argument 
against food aid is that it is only a short-term solution to a long-term problem because the 
aid is consumable: if  countries are afflicted by famine, shipments o f food are only going 
to feed the people for a limited time. After the supplies run out, the country will not have 
remedied the problems with their food production. Populations receiving an influx of 
Northern food can even become dependent on the supply of food, and local production 
will therefore be discouraged. In order for food aid to be effective, it must be 
supplemented with project aid directed towards the agricultural sector o f a country to 
establish a substantial food production system.
Foreign assistance varies by the type of aid given, but also varies by the profile o f the 
donor. Bilateral assistance is one-on-one aid: one donor directs funds to one recipient, 
where the most common donors are govemments. Multilateral assistance is less 
individualistic: a global or world agency deals directly with a recipient government or a 
group o f govemments (Singer 1982, 164). Most often, the donor is an agency in the LfN 
or an NGO. While not all types of aid fit into one category or another and intermediate 
forms of both exist, there exists a strong debate over which type of aid is more effective. 
A popular form of aid combines the two—bilateral assistance is given in a multilateral
framework (Singer 1982, 165). Individual govemments gather together with the recipient 
nation to analyze studies o f the nation’s development progress (most often prepared by 
the World Bank and the nation itself). In this fomm the goals o f the recipient are 
established, and each government determines independently the amount o f aid and in 
what form they are going to offer to the recipient (Singer 1982, 165).
Structural Adjustment Policies
The term ‘stmctural adjustment policies’ (SAPs) can be given a number o f meanings, but 
it is usually taken to characterize the kind of policies recommended to heavily indebted 
countries or who have balance of payments deficits. The aim is to make them credit­
worthy again and to lay the foundations for subsequent sustainable growth. However, in 
general terms, economic adjustment means changing economic policies so as to improve 
economic performance. Distinctions are normally made between stabilization and 
structural adjustment’. The former focuses on immediate change in microeconomic 
policies including tighter monetary policies, reduction of the budget deficit, and exchange 
rate devaluation aimed at achieving short-term equilibrium objectives (bringing aggregate 
demand in line with available resources), lowering inflation, and reducing balance of 
payments deficits. The latter involves more fundamental changes in the way the 
economy operates which includes the removal o f relaxation o f government regulations 
affecting the economy, reform of intemational trade polices or the tax system, and 
privatization; this is intended to allow the adjusting country under adjustment to change
' Woodward (1992).
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the structure o f its economy to meet long-terms needs; mainly by permitting the ‘magic’ 
of t he m arket to  use 1 abour a nd c apital m ore p roductively so as t o i  ncrease economic 
efficiency. In other words, short-term policies aim to restoring the target economy to its 
pre-shock equilibrium while long-term policies seek to reconfigure the equilibrium 
itself.
However, the increased emphasis of the IMF on structural factors in addition to its 
traditional stabilization and structural adjustment programmes structural adjustment have 
resulted in substantial overlapping of concerns and responsibilities. Although the term 
‘structural adjustment’ was first coined by the World Bank, structural adjustment 
programmes, whether from the World Bank or the IMF are fundamentally the same 
because they are based on  a common theory. F or the purpose o f this study the term ‘ 
structural adjustment’ will be used to both short-term and long -term  adjustment and its 
impact on recipients. However, the establishment o f the Bretton Woods Institutions was 
predicated on the assumption that Southern economies, like their European counterparts, 
could a bsorb a nd effectively u tilize 1 arge i nfusions o f  c apital, d espite t he f  act t hat t he 
Third World lacked the level of institutional infrastructure, the economic and social 
background, and the skilled personnel o f Europe. It was the contention o f prominent 
economists of the time, as well as many of their successors, that large amounts o f foreign 
aid, p rivate i nvestment, and e xpanded t rade opportunities w ould p reduce an  e conomic 
"take-off and an export-led growth, the benefits o f which would ultimately trickle down 
to even the poorest members of each society. Under this concept. Structural Adjustment
 ̂Demery (1990).
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Policy reforms (SAP) were introduced to make aid more effective since 1980s. So, SAP 
is very crucial to issue foreign aid or to achieve above said development goal. 
Simultaneously however, issues of poverty and income distribution in relation to 
structural adjustment programmes, including safety nets to protect the most vulnerable 
sections of the population became part of the SAP rhetoric. There was also the 
development of the concept of consultation with govemments as a precursor to the 
pressure to apply SAPs since experience had shown that SAPs were unsuccessful unless 
based on social consensus. So, unfortunately, the failure of this orthodox model of 
economic development to produce sustained economic well-being and growth for most 
Third World countries has come under fire especially in the last two decades. In my 
thesis I will try to discuss and analyze the negative impact of structural adjustment 
reforms, which were provided under the conditions of aid supply.
From definition and historical background of both aid and structural adjustment I would 
like to connect stmctural adjustment policy reform as a pre-condition for aid 
disbursement. Theoretically, aid that is given on the basis of stmctural adjustment policy 
definitely is a conditional aid. Therefore, in my thesis I focus on the impact o f this kind 




The main argument of this thesis is that foreign aid, rather than being a means to 
economic and social development has largely become a system by which most o f the 
developing countries suffer through policy reforms, which are part o f structural 
adjustment programmes. The thesis argues that rather than continuing the present 
arrangement for foreign aid and direct foreign investment, a better means should be found 
to help developing states to achieve economic growth. Foreign aid has produced socio­
economic and environmental problems in most developing countries than it has helped to 
improve these situations. The one main suggestion arising from this thesis is that foreign 
assistance should be directed at helping local economic structure acquire know-how and 
other expertise. In this way, the locals can exploit and utilize their own resources to 
sustain long term development and gradually create self-sustaining economies, whose 
viability will not depend on continuing foreign capital, technology or and other inputs 
which are based on certain policy reforms. I feel that these reform policies often reflect 
the political and strategic interest o f the vested groups locally and externally. I am not 
alone in this viewpoint. It is shared by many others who have studied the subject and 
whose findings I have reviewed. Indeed these studies provide sources o f evidence that I 
rely on to argue my thesis.
Methodology
The evidence in support o f my thesis is based on primary and secondary materials. The 
thesis has been conducted here in Halifax with resources from libraries through out
13
Canada and overseas and from the Internet documents. I did try my best to secure the 
primary and secondary sources, which I obtained from Bangladesh and from other 
confidential documents (UN and other intemational organizations). The Internet was 
another excellent source of data and a timely way of contacting and obtaining from 
intemational organizations such as the UNDP, World Bank, IMF, OECD, and other aid 
providing a gencies. T his a pproach a llowed m e to  p rocure d ata f  rom b oth p rimary a nd 
secondary sources unavailable in North America. It also provided me a means of 
exchanging ideas with others, including some o f the authors of the secondary sources 
consulted. Ideally, 1 would have welcomed the opportunity to rely more intensely on 
Bangladesh for primary sources. Unfortunately, time and budgetary constraint did not 
permit such an undertaking. Most o f my thesis relies on empirical evidence. However, 
given my physical location and the constraints mentioned above, 1 have also had to rely 
on some qualitative data and interpretations.
Working Ideas
There are two schools of thought on the role and impacts of foreign aid— one of them 
with a critical or negative perspective and one of them taking a sanguine or positive 
viewpoint. The positive' viewpoint is based on the idea that foreign aid is a critical factor 
in the development process, providing supplementary resources that the recipient country 
is unable to generate on its own and thus constituting a 'catalyst' in the economic growth 
or development process. The critics of foreign aid come in two forms but essentially 
agree that the overall negative impacts of foreign aid far outweighs its presumed benefits.
14
In this thesis I align myself with arguments advanced in the Political Economy o f aid— a 
school o f thought predicated on the need for radical systemic change to make foreign aid 
workable. Proponents of this school have not constructed a general theory o f aid but their 
empirical findings have given rise to a number of ideas that I have used as a sort of 
scaffolding - a series o f 'working ideas'— in the construction o f an argument in support of 
thesis of this study. These ideas include:
• The provision o f foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations of 
the donors;
• The conditionalities imposed by donor organizations and countries have a 
political dimension, designed more in the interest of donor than recipient 
organizations and countries;
• Under these conditions foreign aid has served as a form of 'pillage' or 
'imperialism', leading to the extraction o f productive resources from the recipient 
country— a process of 'reverse aid'
• This process o f 'reverse aid' has led to conditions of economic regression rather 
than economic development in the aid recipient countries;
• In the process o f foreign aid, govemments in the recipient countries are in a weak 
position, generally unable to secure a 'better deal' for its citizens and their 
economies;
• The overall 'costs' o f aid to the recipient countries are greater than the benefits 
received;
• To fully appreciate the value and role of foreign aid in the development process it 
is necessary to evaluate carefully how and where the benefits and costs are
15
distributed—who bears the costs and who receives the benefits.
• Corruption, inefficiencies and bureaucratic failure in the developing countries are 
often cited as reasons for the negative results o f aid, but a better explanation can 
be found in the political dynamics involved.
The Structure of Thesis Argument
This study is divided into five chapters. Chapter one provides the state o f the problem and 
the definition of foreign aid and structural adjustment programme separately. It also 
includes the description of the research methodology and the fi*amework o f analysis and 
working ideas as well as the thesis statement. C haptertw o advanees m y thesis o n t h e  
basis of a systematic review of evidence provided by existing studies on the dynamics 
and impacts o f foreign aid. Chapter three provides an overview of structural economic 
reforms in  different regimes and the a id s cenario i n B angladesh. Chapter four gives a 
short history of foreign aid since the World War II and identifies structural adjustment 
programme in Bangladesh. It advances an argument for my thesis in describing (and 
explaining) the impact of foreign aid, which is conditioned under structural adjustment 
programme directly or indirectly. Here I describe how structural adjustment reforms 
affect the recipient at socio- economic and the environmental levels. It basically serves 
the purpose of providing a necessary context for my argument in this thesis. On the basis 
of a cost-benefit analysis it is argued that the overall negative impact o f conditional 
foreign aid in this context far outweighs any benefits that have accrued. Chapter five 
concludes the study by reiterating the key arguments presented in the previous chapters
16




Foreign Aid in Theory and Practice: 
A Review of the Evidence
Introduction
Foreign aid has in different periods o f history played an important role in the 
development o f many countries. Some of the countries which are now industrially 
advanced and prosperous are included among them. For instance, the United Kingdom 
received aid from the Netherlands in the 17*'̂  and 18̂ '’ centuries and from the USA in the 
1940s during European reconstruction after the Second World War. The United States, 
now the leading donor country, was also assisted by the United Kingdom in the middle of 
the 19'*̂  century. The Soviet Union also received foreign assistance in its early stage of 
development. The linkage between aid and development has, thus, a fairly long history. It 
was, however, during the post second World War era that external aid assumed a new 
importance and dimension and emerged as a worldwide phenomenon. Foreign aid was 
globally viewed as a critical component o f the growth paradigm, which for nearly half a 
century influenced development concepts, plans and strategies. So most o f the developing 
countries are currently looking forward to  an acceleration o f  the pace o f  development 
progress along this path. This quest poses many challenges, including a searching 
appraisal o f the role of external aid in development. After more than five decades o f the 
development on foreign aid, the vast majority of developing countries are still struggling 
to find a way to get out of poverty and hunger. For instance, “until recently 85-100 
percent o f t h e d  evelopment b udget o f  B angladesh w as financed b y e  xtemal a id. W hat
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was most disturbing was the increasing degree to which recurring expenditure budgets of 
Bangladesh also became heavily dependent on external aid” (Huq and Abrar 1999: 2). 
Economists are also critical o f  the external aid because o f  its  adverse macroeconomic 
effects. In Bangladesh, external aid instead of complementing domestic savings and 
contributing to raising the rate o f investment, acted as a substitute for domestic savings, 
the gross domestic investment ratio as a percentage of GDP being barely 22%^. Aid 
dependence has also fostered certain anti-development attitudes. The process of 
development has become inextricably linked to the search for foreign funds spawning the 
widely held notion that there can be no significant development without external aid. But 
in reality, most o f aid is siphoned off by the influential national interest groups creating, 
in the process, a new rich class and hundreds o f import-export agencies and consultancy 
firms. Foreign aid is give on the basis of conditions and reforms in recipients. For 
instance. Structural adjustment policies (SAP) were introduced in 1980s to make aid 
more effective. But evidence shows that the IMF and the World Bank reform policies not 
only failed but also have a devastating effect on the recipient. Here in the following 
sections I will review for and against aid and its policies on recipients. This chapter 
reviews the debate on the issue of aid and development from different points o f view. 
These points of view are two new ways of highlighting and assessing the impact o f aid on 
national development. These two schools o f thought are: the supportive school and 
critical point of view. The rest of the thesis chapter is thus divided mainly into two 
sections focusing respectively on the supportive and critical approaches to assessing the 
impact o f development aid.




To have a better understanding o f the consistently evolving relationship between foreign 
aid and development, it is first necessary to understand when and why development 
became a focus o f First World countries, and why and how foreign aid was introduced as 
a tool to foster the development process. The end o f the World War II brought mainly 
two international developments: The emergence o f the new independent sovereign states 
in Asia, African and Latin America which changed the political map of the world. 
Secondly, a worldwide movement for development of the new emergent new nations, 
known as the third world, comprising two-third’s o f the world population but 
commanding only a fifth o f the world resources, emerged. The third world urge for rapid 
progress in raising the quality of life of its peoples was reflected in their commitment to 
planned development. The resulting national plans are unique as blueprints o f the most 
exciting social and economic experiments ever undertaken in the history o f human 
endeavor. A striking feature of this global movement was that the upsurge o f enthusiasm 
and the efforts generated by this movement have been shared by the rich countries. As a 
result, thousands of scholars and specialist became participants in this movement and 
international cooperation for development assumed a new magnitude and significance.
International cooperation was enriched in its structure and content through the 
establishment of international financial institutions with a view to promote economic and 
social progress in the developing nations. Notable among them are the World Bank
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(WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The World Bank 
consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the 
International Development Association (IDA). Collectively the World Bank, the IFC and 
the MIGA are generally known as the World Bank Group. During the last five decades 
the world has gone through many changes. These changes included a major shift in the 
concept o f foreign aid and the perception of development goals and strategies. However, 
the modem idea o f foreign assistance began in the aftermath of World War II.
The Bretton Woods system was implemented in 1944 when delegates from 40 countries 
met in New Hampshire to establish the World Bank, which emerged as the international 
organization set to provide financial resources to the war-torn economies of Europe 
(Bowen 1998,4). The United States took individual action in 1948 when they created the 
European Recovery Programme, or the Marshall Plan, which committed $13 billion to 
recovery from World War II (Hoy 1998, 16) and was the largest reconstruction 
programme of the time (Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan 1988, 15). 89% of the funds 
went to European countries, and as a result the recipients saw accelerated economic 
growth by the early 1950’s (Bowen 1998,5). The Marshall Plan set the stage for early 
foreign assistance programmes in developing countries, and was succeeded by the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. This legislation was passed to “utilize large sums o f money to build 
up quickly economic structures and political allegiances deemed necessary to fight 
communism” (Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan 1988, 15). The Mutual Security
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Agency’s goal was to unite military, economic and technical assistance programmes as 
part of United States’ foreign policy.
President Truman, in 1950, reminded the First World o f the moral implications of foreign 
aid to abolish humanity’s “ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair” (Hoy 1 998, 
17). This call o f moral duty did not last due to the explosion of the Cold War. Funds were 
allocated towards infrastructure reconstruction programmes primarily focused on defense 
building, and secondarily towards economic development projects designed to increase 
the flow o f capital to the country. The focus for the United States during the fifties was 
specifically India, Pakistan, and other countries in the Near East, with aid figures totaling 
nearly $ 300 million (Hellinger, Hellinger, and O ’Regan 1 988, 1 5). President Kennedy 
reiterated the moralistic obligation of the First World to combat poverty in  the rest of 
world in 1961, but focused on the connection between US security and foreign aid (Hoy 
1998, 17). The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was established in 
1961—the start o f the “First Development Decade”— and was designed to “promote the 
foreign, security and general welfare of the US by assisting peoples o f the world in their 
efforts toward economic development and internal and external security” (Hoy 1998, 18). 
It was created in response to unsuccessful US foreign aid policies that had attempted to 
foster long-term development. USAID far exceeded past foreign policy programmes 
because it actually established an organizational structure to better serve the recipients’ 
needs.
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The Cold War had a strong influence on the direction of US foreign aid towards the 
promotion of democracy and stability in countries unaffiliated with the US or the USSR 
(Hoy 1998, 21). The Second Decade of Development, the 1970s, promoted ‘basic human 
needs’ in response to the famines in Africa and the oil crisis o f the Middle East (Bowen 
1998, 7), as well as to combat the negative view of foreign aid among US citizens. The 
United States turned its efforts to the Caribbean and Latin America, where the focus 
shifted from industrialization and savings rate to rural development and employment 
(Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan 1988, 21). A réévaluation o f the effectiveness of 
foreign assistance led to the “New Direction” legislation incorporated in the Foreign 
Assistance Act of the mid-1970s (Hellinger, et al. 1988, 22). The goal o f this revamped 
foreign aid policy was to ensure the flow o f foreign assistance directly to the poorest of 
countries to stimulate development (Hoy 1998, 22). “Food for development” replaced the 
notion o f Food Aid and stipulated that nations receiving food were not expected to repay 
the loans given to purchase the supplies as long as they went towards the establishment of 
development programmes in agriculture, nutrition, health services and population 
planning (Hoy 1998, 24). This project failed, however, due to the inability o f the recipient 
countries to properly establish the infrastructure o f these development programmes. The 
liberal aid policies of the 1970s were redirected when conservatives seized control o f the 
White House in the 1980s (Hellinger, Hellinger and O ’Regan, 1988, 26). President 
Reagan redirected foreign aid’s focus from the humanitarian to militaristic, and 
sustainable development became the goal o f US foreign aid in the United States (Hoy 
1998, 22L
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In the 1980s, the majority o f US foreign aid was in the form of militaristic aid through the 
formation of the Military Assistance Programme (Hoy 1998: 21). In 1989, Japan replaced 
the US as the lead donor o f “absolute amount o f funds transferred” (Hoy 1998: 31). With 
the fall o f  communism, hopes soared among the Tbird World nations that the goal o f  
foreign aid would shift from a political to a developmental focus. However, previously 
communist nations were added to the list o f recipients, and Third World countries 
received less aid than previously allocated (Hoy 1998: 27).
In theoretical perspective
Modernization theory, which provides the dominant mainstream approach regarding 
foreign aid, seeks to explain the gap between the North and the South. This theory 
contends that development in the North can be attributed to the “discovery o f secrets of 
sustained economic growth” (Lairson and Skidmore 1997,222). The establishment of 
specific political, economic and social programmes and policies embracing the ideologies 
of capitalism and democracy are the frontrunner o f development, Many different 
definitions for development exist, but those preaching philosophies o f the modem day 
democratic nation stem from the modernist perspective on development. This notion 
embraces free trade, industrialization, democracy, relatively little control by political or 
religious authorities, and other ideals inherent in democratic societies, and holds that 
Third World countries that adopt these attitudes o f the democratic/capitalist world will 
successfully develop.
The contending perspective, dependency theory, rejects the ethnocentrism of the
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modernist theory and places the blame for Third World poverty on imperialism and First 
World supremacy. According to dependency theory, the North purposely prevented the 
South from developing because the North believed that holding their colonies as 
underdeveloped would fuel their own development. It is often associated with the 
communist school o f thought because it is an anti-democratic philosophy that places the 
blame on the First World. According to Lairson and Skidmore, “Dependency theory 
views Northern economic and political penetration of the South as exploitive, producing 
a transfer of resources from the poor to the rich” (Lairson and Skidmore 1997: 229).
Since the fall o f communism and even during the Cold War theories thought to be 
associated with the communist school of thought were branded as evil, conspiracy- 
oriented philosophies. In truth, most donors of foreign aid have traditionally been the 
democratic nations, and therefore most policies o f foreign assistance embrace the 
modernist school of thought and in some way seek to establish democratic and capitalist 
principals in underdeveloped nations, whether through economic or political means. 
Therefore, all the theories on  development have roots in  the modernist perspective on  
development.
The Supportive Evidence
The proponents of foreign aid make many claims about the good that aid does, including 
higher mean incomes in developing nations, higher literacy rates around the world, higher 
life expectancies around the world (Easterbrook 2002,16-20). The world’s average life 
expectancy is 66 (Easterbrook 2002, 16-20). The highest life expectancy rate o f any
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nation in sub-Saharan Africa is Botswana, with an average life expectancy of 65 
(Boroughs 1996,52). There are many ways o f depicting the success o f aid. In the broadest 
terms, the low-income countries have achieved increases in real incomes and improved 
living standards to which aid has contributed. Excluding India and China, their life 
expectancy rose hy almost 25 percent between 1965 and 1989, and infant morality 
declined by more than a third; Primary school enrolments rose from 49 to 70 percent o f 
the relevant age group over a similar period. The growth in per capita income has been 
disappointing, at 1.4 percent a year: though another way o f putting this is to say that per 
capita income increased by 34 percent despite population growth o f 62 percent over the 
two and a h a lf  decades. ( India and China have made significantly greater progress, in  
China's case with little assistance from aid.)
Aid has helped not only today's low-income countries, but also some which started in the 
low-income group and have risen to the middle income category. Korea is perhaps the 
most spectacular example, but several others—Brazil, Colombia, Thailand, for 
example—have also made remarkable progress (Cassen 1994). More will follow, and aid 
will demonstrably have helped to lay the foundations for their growth. The contributions 
o f aid can also be described in other ways. Sector by sector across economies, aid has 
built infrastructure, promoted agriculture and manufacturing, helped to extend the reach 
of basic services, provided skilled manpower, and promoted institution building.
An increasingly important part o f aid today is the policy dialogue that accompanies it. 
Here, too, both earlier and more recent experience can testify to significant successes.
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Much of the world's attention is presently focused on sub-Saharan Africa. The question 
inevitably arises: if  most aid works, why has Africa's development been so halting? Part 
o f the answer is that aid's success has been more common in Asia and the rest o f the 
developing countries. Sub-Saharan Africa has been the most intractable environment for 
development generally and therefore for aid. It has had several major disadvantages 
compared with other developing regions: smaller proportions o f literate and educated 
people, less stable political structures, less settled administrative institutions with shorter 
traditions. In addition, sub-Saharan Africa has faced peculiarly difficult external 
conditions: in particular, dependence on primary commodity exports facing highly 
unstable markets, and long periods of deteriorating terms of trade. All these factors have 
left the region without major attractions to private overseas investors, and most countries 
have been heavily dependent on aid for foreign capital.
Africa's agro-climatic conditions are also unfavorable. They include a proneness to long 
periods o f drought, and vary greatly over the continent. As a result, there has been no 
possibility, as there was in South Asia, for a small number of high-yielding crop varieties 
to transform agriculture over vast areas. And the region has had the worlds fastest 
population growth -rates, close to the demographic maximum in countries such as Kenya, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Tanzania, and likely to rise in many countries where death 
rates still have far to fall and fertility will follow only slowly.
As if these obstacles to development were not enough, hindsight now suggests that the 
model followed by most developing counties was peculiarly unpromising for those of
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sub-Saharan Africa. African countries sought industrialization and modernization as an 
antidote to the colonial economic structure they inherited, in which the only developed 
sectors equipped with infrastructure were enclaves o f mineral and export crop production, 
and settler agriculture. The mass o f their people was in the undeveloped hinterland, 
engaged in subsistence agriculture. Industrialization policies led to a good deal of capital- 
intensive investment, uneconomic import substitution, and disadvantages for agriculture 
under a regime o f overvalued exchange rates. Parastatal agencies expanded as part o f an 
often burdensome public sector which, where it was engaged in marketing, did not create 
a price structure that would encourage investment and production. For a long time aid 
donors accommodated these policies. Some o f them fitted in with their own commercial 
interests o f exporting capital goods.
There was also a genuine desire to avoid neo-colonial imposition of policies on newly 
independent states. Today both donors and recipients can see all too clearly the failings of 
the old model. The current emphasis on policy-based lending is leading to a new realism 
on both sides. Policies have already been reformed in several African countries; others 
are following suit. The effectiveness o f aid to sub-Saharan Africa has been inseparable 
from the e ffectiveness o f  development o verall. The prospects are now  good for major 
improvement in both, provided that donors and recipients play their mutual and 
cooperative parts to the full. However the reasons for aid failure are as follows which are 
found in the book of mainstream liberal reformist, Robert Cassen (1994). When aid goes 
wrong, it is usually for several fairly common reasons to fail. It is not easy to generalize 
why these factors occur where they do, yet are absent in the much larger number of cases
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when a 11 g oes w ell. T he f  ault 1 ies w ith the d onor o r t he r ecipient, o r b  oth; s ometimes 
misfortune o r the unexpected can be  the culprit. 0 n the donors'side, one o f th e  m ost 
common causes o f failure is the excessive intrusion of commercial or political motives. 
When the (bilateral) donor is less interested in development than in the sale of equipment 
or in the political gains from supporting a regime, it is not surprising that aid may give a 
poor retum  economically. ( This is  not to say that a 11 su ch a id  is ineffective; only that 
these are potential causes of failure.) Many projects are technically poor, ill-designed for 
their intended purpose. But poor design, even when not the result of the donors' 
commercial purposes, is at least sometimes culpable, the result of inattention to local 
circumstances, or of failure to profit from available experience.
In general also, donor agencies are not all that good at avoiding repetition o f their own 
mistakes; and they are worse at avoiding each other's, since there is very little 
communication about failure from one agency to another. These defects, coupled with the 
incentives to individuals in the agencies simply to get loans made, are probably 
responsible for a significant share of the aid that goes wrong. There is a strong case for 
major efforts to improve the learning process, and for strengthening within agencies the 
incentives to improve the quality of lending, not just its quantity. Much less reprehensible 
are the projects that go wrong because donors and recipients are trying to do ambitious 
things in difficult circumstances. Sometimes they may neglect to uncover information, 
which might have forestalled failure. More g enerally, however, they are simply taking 
bigger risks. Innovative activity must be encouraged, and its occasional failure should not 
give grounds for abandoning the attempt. It is much easier to run infrastructure projects
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in South East Asia than to reach poor farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. But it is precisely 
where the challenge and the difficulties are greatest that aid is most needed.
On the other hand, why some aid fails can be found on the recipients' side. Often aid 
activities are unsuccessful because of the policy environment in which they operate, or 
because o f administrative deficiencies in the recipient country, or because the 
government does not take a keen enough interest in implementing them. (The donor too 
may be implicated, if  it knows of these conditions and makes no attempt to circumvent 
them.) Recipient governments, like donors, can have political and commercial motives 
which are at odds with the needs of development. The recipient may have an excessive 
attachment to 'prestige projects' with low developmental priority, or to 'advanced' and 
unsuitable technology. Sometimes the recipient is at fault when he declines technical 
assistance that is really needed. In recent years, however, several aid projects have 
crumbled because the recipient government was simply unable to provide counterpart 
finances from its heavily constrained budget. Sometimes they had internal causes, 
because the government was spending heavily on non-development items. Sometimes aid 
itself was the cause, because donors were not coordinating their projects and the 
implications of them for financial management. Precisely who or what is at fault here? 
Recipient, donor, the world economy—perhaps something of all three.'’
 ̂ Cassen ( 1994).
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A Critical Review of the Evidence
Normally, the literature on foreign aid is divided into two parts. First, is on the effects of 
aid on the recipients and the second is on the determinants of aid. It means who gives to 
whom and why. On the first point, Jepma (1997) presents a broad survey o f the literature 
from the seventies onward. His conclusions are that, for the most part, foreign aid crowds 
out private saving, supports public consumption, and has no significant positive impact 
on the recipients' macroeconomic policies and growth. This survey, however, correctly 
points out several methodological weaknesses o f the early literature. If one observes a 
correlation between aid, poverty, and bad policies, does this mean that foreign aid is 
misdirected, or that aid is used to relieve the sufferings o f the populations o f countries 
with economic problems? A m ore recent 1 iterature inspired b y  the renewed interest in  
cross -country growth empirics, has addressed this issue. In a series o f papers Boone 
(1994, 1996) finds that foreign aid has absolutely no effects on investment and growth in 
a large sample o f developing countries, after controlling for the endogeneity o f aid flows. 
Burnside and Dollar (1997) had a study on the interactions among choice o f 
macroeconomic policies, aid and growth. They found that aid is beneficial to countries 
that adopt appropriate and stable policies, and otherwise it is wasted. However, they find 
no evidence that foreign aid encourages the adoption o f "good" macroeconomic policies. 
They also suggest that donors "strategic" interests are more important than the quality of 
the policies o f  the receiving countries as an explanation o f aid flows.
Who gives aid to whom and why is a central question here. Lumsdaine (1997) 
emphasizes several determinants of the direction o f aid, which we can consider here, such
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as colonial history, the democratic status o f the recipients, income levels, etc. Lumsdaine 
emphasizes the “moral vision" that, according to him, underlies foreign aid giving. This 
"idealistic" view sharply contrasts with a voluminous literature that has argued that 
strategic foreign policy concerns explain the pattern o f foreign aid. For instance, this 
point is made by Maizels and Nssanke (1984)^. Unfortunately, the measurement o f what 
a "strategic interest" is varies from study to study and is occasionally tautological. As a 
result, the literature is rather fragmented, with one study emphasizing this or that variable 
and with relatively little attempt at confronting the impact of different variables and their 
interactions. In other words, while, there is some general agreement about what matters 
for aid giving, namely poverty o f the recipients, strategic interests, colonial history, trade, 
political institutions of the recipients, etc, there is virtually no solid evidence on the 
relative importance o f different variables^. The complexity o f the determinants of aid 
flows is  well d ocumented b y  a recent study by Schraeder, H ook and Taylor (1998). 
They restrict their attention to Africa and easily reject an altruistic vision o f donors' 
motivation. They also highlight interesting differences between donors, related to their 
position in the world order, strategic interest and relationship with former colonies. 
Finally, most authors find that the determinants o f bilateral and multilateral aid are quite 
different and one cannot explain the two together^.
However, in a recent study on the pattern o f allocation of foreign aid from various donors 
to receiving countries it finds considerable evidence that the direction o f foreign aid is
 ̂This paper also includes a good survey o f the literature on this point, Up to the mid- eighties.
® For example Trumbull and Wall (1994) find that a measure of infant mortality in their specification is 
stronger than income per capita of the recipients country in explaining bilateral aid, a result which does not 
survive in our results below.
 ̂See for instance Maizels and Nissanke (1984) on the difference between bilateral and multilateral aid.
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dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than by the economic needs 
and policy performance o f the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are the 
major determinants o f foreign aid. At the margin, however, countries that democratize 
receive m ore aid. W hile foreign aid flows r espond m ore topo litica l variables, foreign 
direct investments are more sensitive to economic incentives, particularly “good policies” 
and protection of property rights in the receiving countries*.
Besides economists, scholars from other disciplines, notably political science and 
international relations, have also done considerable research on aid. This non-economic 
literature mentions three distinct strands of thoughts. According to one explanation 
(Spicer 1966; Nossal 1988), the main motivation o f aid is political, aimed at advancing 
the power and influence of the donor. A second explanation (Tomlinson 1991; Carty and 
Smith, 1981), emphasizes the importance of economic and commercial importance as 
determinants. A third approach to aid (Lavergne 1989) stresses the altruistic dimension of 
aid policy. Many o f the econometric studies in this area have been heavily influenced by 
the above writings. One of these studies was by the Canadian Economic Council, which 
examined the distribution of bilateral aid from 1970-1978.
The study looked at the following determinants: political (whether aid depends on ties 
with the commonwealth and Francophone counties), commercial (whether aid goes 
mainly to countries importing Canadian goods), and humanitarian (whether aid flows 
mainly to relatively poor countries). The economic council found that the countries most
Alesina, Alberto and Dollar, David.(1998), “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why”? National Bureau 
of Economic Research Paper Series, MA, USA.
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likely to receive aid were those with relatively low per-capita incomes, either 
Francophone or Commonwealth, and with relatively large populations. As for the 
allocation decision, the most important factor proved to be the amount o f aid received by 
the recipient country from other donors, followed by that country’s commonwealth 
status.
Two models for the distribution of aid appeared in the literature. One argued that aid is 
given mainly according to the socioeconomic needs of the recipients, and the other 
countered that donor interests are the main motivation behind aid. Several studies have 
tried to test the validity o f these two models. One of the pioneering studies was conducted 
by McKinlay and Little (1979); it rested on a cross-country regression analysis of the US 
bilateral aid programme from 1960 to 1970. The study found that the overriding motives 
for aid were military and political interest, not recipient needs. A study by Maizels and 
Nissanke ( 1984), also b ased oneross-eountry r egressions, 1 ooked a t b oth b daterai and 
multilateral aid. It found that bilateral largely depended on donor interests, whereas 
multilateral aid had recipient need as its driving force. Several other writers have found 
refined or extended the above research. For example, Trumbull and Wall (1994) 
incorporated a political/human rights dimension into the analysis and found it to be 
significant, while Mosley (1987) found evidence that the adjustment of aid supply lagged 
behind changes in demand. Gounder (1995) tested the validity o f the recipient needs and 
donor interests models for Australia’s bilateral aid from 1986 to 1992 and came up with 
mixed results. Boone (1994) found that, irrespective o f the politieal regime, the main 
purpose o f aid is to increase wasteful public consumption and strengthen the elitist group
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in power. Note, however, that several variables in this study, such as civil liberties and 
political interests, may be subject to data and measurement problems. Alesina and Dollar 
(1998) found that the allocation of bilateral aid is dictated by strategic and geo-political 
considerations, while foreign direct investment appears driven primarily by the economic 
incentives. In a similar vein, Schraeder. Hook and Taylor’s (1998) analysis o f Africa led 
them to conclude that the main determinants of aid are the former colonial status o f the 
aid-receiving country and its political strategic position, and altruism.
Thus, the foregoing literature leads one to conclude that aid is given mainly for political 
and strategic considerations, not philanthropy. This seems consistent with the results of 
several studies, which have found that foreign aid has not really helped prevent global 
poverty (World Bank 1998; Hansen and Trap 2000). In addition to the above, the 
literature also mentions several factors that have hindered aid.
One is the tendency o f recipient countries to following policies that make it difficult for 
aid to succeed. This is the position of the World Bank (1998), based on the research by 
Burnside and Dollar ( 1997). It found that aid  tends to  promote growth only w hen the 
recipient country adopts growth-enhancing policies. This view, however, has been 
challenged by some critics who argue that when the non-linear relationship between aid 
and growth in taken into account, aid seems to energize growth, regardless o f the policy 
environment in the recipient country.
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A second factor impending foreign aid is the concept o f tied aid. Tying arises when a 
donor requires a recipient to use aid to buy the donor’s exports. Exports include not only 
goods but also technical co-operation and associate financing; this financing itself 
includes mixed credits (mixing of commercial export credits with eoncessional aid 
funds), co-fmaneing (many agencies financing a project) and parallel financing (lenders’ 
exports credit and aid agencies administer two separate transactions). For example, 
Canada tends to rank relatively high in terms of the proportion o f tied bilateral aid. For 
example, in 1999, 70.4 percent o f Canada’s aid was tied aid, the fourth highest out o f 19 
reporting countries (OECD 2000, Table 23). (The publie perception is that multilateral 
aid is not entirely free of tying. For instance, some o f the hiring for technical assistance 
provided under multilateral aid comes under the Canadian Trust Fund, which is 
essentially tied aid).
The literature offers several arguments to justify the tied aid (Spicer 1996). One is that 
the tied aid serves to promote Canadian exports and domestic job creation. The other 
arguments include winning the support of the public for the aid programme, helping the 
Canadian industries to penetrate new markets, and preventing the subsidization of trading 
rivals’ export, which would occur if  aid were untied.
Given the above considerations, it is heartening to find that the OECD recently signed an 
agreement designed to untie bilateral aid to the least developed countries (OECD2001). 
However, the agreement has several weaknesses. First, for example, LDCs account for 
less that 1.5 percent o f Canada’s ODA, which suggests that the agreement will carry very
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little weight (CIDA 2001,p.29). Second, the agreement leaves out associate financing 
(mixed credits and financing). Lastly, because the agreement is voluntary, the risk o f non- 
compliance is high.
A third reason for aid’s failure to alleviate global poverty pertains to the fungibility o f the 
aid itself, that is, the recipient country may use it for purposes other than those intended 
hy the donor. H owever, the evidence from single-country experiences ( Pack and P ack 
1990; 1993) is mixed. By comparison, two more recent studies by Cashel-Cordo and 
Steven Craig (1997) and Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) based on cross-country 
analyses show more conclusively that fungibility poses a major problem to the donor.
A fourth major impediment to aid cited in the literature is corruption in the recipient 
country. A 1999 study hy Alesina and Weder on this issue came up with the following 
conclusions. First, there is evidence that aid seems to flow mainly to the more corrupt 
government. Second, corruption tends to deter m ore private flows than it does official 
aid. Third, there is no evidence that foreign aid reduces corruption. Finally, some 
commentators have argued that the lack o f local participation in the recipient country also 
impedes the success of the aid programme (Michel 1997). In this context, one mechanism 
widely seen as an engine o f local participation is the nongovernmental organization 
(NGO). CIDA funding of NGOs (including non-governmental institutions like 
universities) has increased rapidly over time.
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As for the performance o f NGOs, the available evidence, although fragmentary, 
anecdotal, and plagued by measurement problems (Smillie and Helmich, 1999), reveals a 
mixed record, both in Canada and abroad. While some progress has been made in such 
areas as education and humanitarian assistance, NGOs have not fared as well in areas like 
poverty alleviation, environmental protection (Broadhead et al.1989: 145-147), the 
provision of rural credit and gender equality (UNDP: 1993).
Among the factors that have thwarted the progress of NGOs are inefficient human- 
resource management, poor project design and evaluation, excessive dependence on 
donor agencies, and doubts about the legitimacy and accountability o f some NGOs 
(Edwards and Hulme 1996). Further tensions have plagued ties between Northern NGOs 
and donor agencies (Broadhead and Pratt 1994), between Northern and Southern NGOs 
(Malena 1995), and between Southern NGOs and respective national governments (Davis 
1998).
Another critical analysis o f foreign aid was conducted by James Petras and Henry 
Veltmeyer in the article “Age o f Reverse Aid: Neo-liberalism as Catalyst o f Regression” 
(Development and Change,Vol-33, No. 2 April 2002). Here they found that in a three- 
year period, 1995-97, over $157 billion in profits were repatriated, according the 
Economic Commission for Latin America. Thus aid and the conditions imposed on aid 
recipients facilitate the takeover of lucrative enterprises and the repatriation o f billions of 
dollars to aid the global accumulation process.
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Foreign aid by the IFI (international financial institutions) influenced by the USA (World 
Bank, the IMF, IDB) is conditioned on the lowering of trade barriers, ending subsidies 
and cutting back public spending on social services. The result has been a loss o f market 
shares by local enterprises, rising unemployment and underemployment and the de­
industrialization o f some countries and the proliferation o f sweatshop or low wage 
assembly plants where the workers are denied the right to organize, access to social 
welfares benefits and protection of labor legislation. Other changes are reflected in 
widespread social conditions associated with increasing disparities in the distribution of 
wealth and income, falling wages, deteriorating health, a rise in the rate o f unemployment 
and the proliferation of low incomes that UNRISD (1995), among others, attributes to the 
social effects of globalization and structural adjustment.
Several important points can be raised from the colonial experience o f conquest and aid 
that are relevant today. In the first place, aid subsumes commercial transactions beneficial 
to the donors. Secondly, the benefits of aid to the recipient are not equitably distributed 
among the different classes, gender and ethnic groups, with the bulk accruing to elite 
collaborators. Thirdly, the asymmetrical political and economic linkage between aid 
donors and aid recipients lead to long -term, large-scale transfer o f wealth, property and 
power that favours Euro-American donors, while the benefits to recipient regimes are 
independent o f the claims and perhaps, good intention of foreign aid, the systemic 
conditions (unequal power and exchange), the class nature o f the donor regimes 
(dominance of MNCs and financial institutions), the political economic matrix o f aid 
(protectionism and subsidies in the donor countries and neoliberalism in the recipient
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countries) and the subordinate nature o f the regime in the recipient countries 
(macroeconomic policy dictated by the IFI technocrats). So foreign aid is a catalyst for 
aid reversal. It means the transfer o f wealth to the donor countries.
The tendency of donors to channel funds via NGOs for poverty alleviation has had little 
positive effect. On the contrary, foreign aid directed toward NGOs has undermined 
national decision-making, as most projects and priorities are set out by the European or 
USA-based NGOs. In addition, NGO projects fail to deal with the structural problems 
and crisis of the recipient countries. So, NGO funding has led to a proliferation of 
competing groups, which set communities and groups against each other, undermining 
existing social movements. Foreign aid channeled to NGOs complements the 
privatization agenda of the IFI rather that compensating for the social damage inflicted by 
their ‘free market’, debt bondage, and privatization policies.
Foreign aid strengthens the profoundly authoritarian tendencies in the executive branches 
of government, undermining popular beliefs in electoral process and representative 
government. To the publicists and promoters o f free markets in Europe and US, effective 
government and good governance is measured by the ability o f client regimes to 
promptly and effectively implement ‘unpopular’ pro-corporate policies while limiting 
political protest.
Foreign aid greases the wheels of corruption. Bribes to state officials paid by leading US 
and European MNCs to secure favourable terms during privatization. Foreign aid is not
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the cause of corruption in many cases but the catalyst to the corruption. In a controversial 
new book o f Michael Maren (1997), The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects o f  Foreign 
Aid and International Charity, he argues that foreign aid is worse than useless. His 
experience with foreign aid in Africa over the past two decades is extensive, first with the 
Peace Corps, then with Catholic Relief Services, finally as a journalist. In an interview, 
Maren contends that little o f the money contributed by taxpayers ends up in the hands o f 
the needy; most is absorbed by multinational corporations, foreign aid bureaucracies, or 
political dictators. He explains, “If you're doing aid work in Kenya, you're supporting the 
government of Kenya, which itself is the reason for most of the problems in Kenya. 
They're the ones w ho are choking off farmers and not allowing them to sell grains or 
coffee or whatever to the highest bidder. They're the ones who are stifling the local 
economy.” Maren, from his experiences, sees foreign aid as a new imperialism, and just 
as the West allowed its colonies political freedom, it should now allow them economic 
freedom as well.
Aid is based on policy improvements and good governance — implementation o f the 
privatization and free market agenda. It is the large-scale transfer o f public property that 
is the source o f corruption. From the perspective o f the majority o f the electorate, good 
governance means-rejecting the intrusion and threat o f the IFI and their conditioned 
foreign aid. It means resisting cuts in social budgets and the soft loans that are attached to 
these regressive proposals. Good governance means safeguarding strategic economic 
sectors from corporate takeover and resisting the financial destabilization efforts o f donor 
countries. Above all, good governance means redistributing wealth and defending
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popular decision making against the neo-authoritarian elites who are the current foreign 
aid recipients. Despite occasional official rhetoric, foreign aid has never financed a 
comprehensive land reform programme. In fact, most loans by the IFI and bilateral 
financing are directed at modernizing large-scale commercial landlords at the expense of 
landless farm workers and peasants.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that each o f these two schools o f thought has advanced some useful 
ideas in regard to the role o f aid on development in third world countries. The aid 
supportive school o f thought argues that foreign aid has increased literacy, improved 
health conditions and helped alleviate poverty. In addition, aid has served in crisis 
situations during famine or natural disaster or in situations o f conflict experienced by 
countries at war. The World Bank, the IMF and other multinational agencies are the best 
examples of established supportive institutions o f foreign aid. On the other hand, the 
critical school o f thought argues that aid could be an important catalyst o f growth and 
development but there should be some changes and reform. Without changes and reforms 
aid is unproductive consumption only. However, it argues that foreign aid works as a tool 
of political and strategic interest to the benefit of donors, rather than the recipients’ vast 
poor interests. According to this school o f thought, aid has increased poverty, corruption 
and the gap between rich and poor. It only benefits the political and economic elite 
groups in society. It makes the recipients dependent rather than self-sufficient.
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Each school of thought provides relevant evidence on aid and each school also has 
evidence in support o f the arguments and ideas about aid and development. Thus, on the 
basis of a literature review it is not possible to draw any hard and fast conclusion. Each 
set o f ideas needs to be tested against the available evidence. This is, in effect, the main 
aim and purpose of this thesis. Etowever, as a guide to my research and analysis, a 
number o f guiding ideas have been derived from my review of the literature. They are 
formulated as a theoretical and conceptual framework in Chapter One. For the most part, 
these ideas are derived from the critical school on aid but as such they are not treated as 
‘truths’ but rather as possible explanations or hypotheses. They are formulated as such as 
ideas to be tested against the evidence that I have collected and analyzed related to 
Bangladesh’s aid reform policies or structural adjustment policies and their impact.
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Chapter Three
An Overview o f Economic Reforms in Different Regimes
and the Aid Scenario
Introduction
Bangladesh began stepping towards the free market economic reforms since 1975 and 
after the fall of socialist-oriented first new regime of the newly independent country- 
Bangladesh, though structural economic reform had appeared before that period on the 
agenda of the International financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Over the last 27 years, successive regimes, both 
military and civilian, undertook wide-ranging reform policies that led to the creation of 
what is often called a market-friendly Ifamework for economic governance. Their 
policies focused primarily on restructuring the public sector, adopting an export oriented 
growth strategy, strengthening the private sector, liberalizing the trade and exchange 
regimes, and establishing an enabling environment for economic growth.
Most studies claim that after more than a quarter century o f experiments with market 
reform, Bangladesh’s economy is still struggling to both sustain macroeconomic stability 
and develop a framework for rapid economic growth. Despite some progress in 
stabilizing the economy in the early 1990s, the sudden increase in fiscal deficit, record 
low foreign exchange reserves, weak balance o f payment situation, a revenue shortfall, 
and the crash of the capital markets have already called in to question the ability of 
Bangladesh to restore the fiscal health of its economy through liberalization programmes.
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What concerns policy-makers and development practitioners most, however, is the slow 
progress that Bangladesh made in improving its dismal human development record.
The performance of the economy, which grew 5 percent a year during the 1990s, proved 
to be inadequate to make a dent on the country’s poverty conditions. Bangladesh still has 
the highest ineidence of poverty in the region. Some 45 million people, in other words, 
half of its 89 million rural populations live below the poverty line. The deteriorating 
poverty situation in urban areas is making things even worse. A vast majority o f the poor 
have little or no access to education, health eare, safe drinking water, and other essential 
serviees.
The World Bank blames “the unfinished reform programme” for the failure o f the 
country to  bring the poor out o f  poverty. It therefore foeuses on  the need for further 
accelerating reforms, “choosing the high road o f faster policy and institutional reforms” 
(World Bank, 1995: xvii). By contrast, a number o f authors have criticized the 
international creditor community for imposing inappropriate reform policies that failed 
miserably to address the unique socio-economic reality o f Bangladesh (Sobhan, 1993). 
Why and how market reforms failed to bring about desired socio-economic results, it 
argues that economic reforms were used primarily to eonsolidate the power o f the ruling 
elites. Suecessive regimes treated market reforms as an instrument to build and maintain 
political coalitions in particular with traders and industrialists. In exchange for political 
support, they allowed business elites to use market liberalization programmes as the 
primary tool to attain their financial and economic objectives. As a consequenee.
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economic liberalization programmes hardly contributed to the improvement in the 
macroeconomic management of the economy. Nor did they succeed in achieving the 
goals of human development.
This chapter is comprised of eight main sections. It first looks an over-view o f economic 
condition o f the immediate independent nation under Sheikh Mujubur Rahman regime 
(1971-75). It then looks critically at the liberalization measures undertaken by General 
Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981). Section three presents an explanation for the political use of 
pro-market reforms by General Hussain Mohammad Ershad’s (1982-1990) military 
regime. In particular, it analyzes why a military general focused more on the ways of 
developing a political coalition with key socio-political actors for his contested regime 
than developing a healthy market mechanism. Section four, five and six provide an 
account o f the failure o f the three democratically elected regimes o f Prime minister 
Begum Khaleda Zia (1991-1996), Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed (1996-2001) and 
Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia (2001-2003) to enact and enforce laws necessary to 
improve governance in the financial sector. By identifying the main eonstituencies of 
Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, it examines the growing role o f big business in 
the country’s decision-making.
In addition, this section connects the regime style with the provision of aid and its 
separation into grants and loans. This part also connects the world political system with 
the structural changes and is part o f the reason why structural economic reforms do not
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work. They are often based on political consideration, not economic development. The 
last section offers some concluding remarks based on its main findings.
The Regime of President Shiekh Mujibur Rhman (1971-75)
The economic situation facing Bangladesh as it emerged from the war of independence in 
1971 included the highest rural population density in the entire world, an annual 
population growth rate between 2.5 and 3 percent, chronic malnutrition for perhaps the 
majority of the people, and the dislocation o f between 8 and 10 million people who had 
fled to India and returned to independent Bangladesh by 1972. The new nation had few 
experienced entrepreneurs, managers, administrators, engineers, or technicians. There 
were critical shortages o f essential food grains and other staples because o f wartime 
disruptions. External markets for jute had been lost because o f the instability o f supply 
and the increasing popularity o f synthetic substitutes. Foreign exchange resources were 
minuscule, and the banking and monetary system was unreliable. Although Bangladesh 
had a large workforce, the vast reserves o f undertrained and underpaid workers were 
largely illiterate, unskilled, and underemployed. Commercially exploitable industrial 
resources, except for natural gas, were lacking. Inflation, especially for essential 
consumer goods, ran between 300 and 400 percent. The war o f independence had 
crippled the transportation system. Hundreds o f road and railroad bridges had been 
destroyed or damaged, and rolling stock was inadequate and in poor repair. The new 
country was still recovering from a severe cyclone that hit the area in 1970 and cause 
250,000 deaths. India, by no means a wealthy country and without a tradition o f giving
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aid to other nations, came forward immediately with massive economic assistance in the 
first months after the fighting ended. Between December 1971 and January 1972, India 
committed US$232 million in aid to Bangladesh, almost all o f it for immediate 
disbursement. The largest single element in Indian aid was 900,000 tons o f food grains. 
The United States and the World Bank thereafter became leading foreign aid donors, and 
the World Bank organized a consortium known as the Bangladesh Aid Group, 
comprising twenty-six international financial institutions and foreign governments 
interested in assisting Bangladesh's development. In October 1974, the Bangladesh Aid 
Group was established under the aegis o f the World Bank, with twenty-six participating 
governments and institutions. Commitments o f the aid group were US$551 million in FY 
1974 and US$1.2 billion the following year. Aid to Bangladesh has remained at a high 
level since the consortium came into existence, although with substantial fluctuations in 
new commitments from year to year. So, during most this period the situation was 
devastating and everything had to be started from the beginning. But Shiekh Mujibur 
Rhman was trying to shape the political and economic structure in the form of socialism. 
But all his plan came into end after his assassination in August 15, 1975.
The Regime of General Zia Ur Rhman (1975-81)
The severe financial and economic crisis that General Zia had inherited from the Awami 
League (AL) regime created the ground for his neoliberal regime to initiate a formal 
search for a better alternative to the excessively interventionist development model 
adopted by the Mujib government that came into power after the inception o f Bangladesh 
in 1971. Zia’s desire to move away from the state-led development approach was clearly
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manifested in December 1975 when his military regime announced its first major 
economic policy, which came to he known as the Revised Investment Policy (RIP). One 
of the major objectives o f this RIP was to allow the private sector to play a major role in 
national economic development. I t emphasized the need for transferring State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) to the private sector and encouraged private entrepreneurs to invest in 
all hut 8 strategically important sectors. The RIP significantly increased the ceiling of 
private investment to Taka (Bangladeshi currency) 100 million and announced that the 
state would never nationalize any private enterprises. I t  offered compensation to those 
Bengali and non-Bengali owners who had suffered financial losses due to the Mujih 
regime’s nationalization programme. The Revised Investment Policy also opened up new 
opportunities for foreign investors and facilitated the formation o f the country’s first 
Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in the port city o f Chittagong (Government of 
Bangladesh, 1976: 228-29).
Central to Zia’s pro-market reforms was a comprehensive disinvestment programme that 
allowed private investors to  hecome the engine of B angladesh’s economic g rowth. A 
series of actions, including the creation o f a Disinvestment Board, were undertaken 
simply to facilitate the role of the private sector in both industrialization and capital 
mobilization. The Disinvestment Board, for instance, was given the responsibility for 
implementing the regime’s just announced privatization policies. Efforts were made to 
foster private investment largely through the reactivation of the Dhaka Stock Exchange 
and the establishment of an Investment Promotion Center in Dhaka. Zia’s military 
regime also directed Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) to provide massive
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financial support to private entrepreneurs leading to the emergence o f the DFIs as the 
major financial source of private investment in Bangladesh (Sobhan & Mahmood, 1991: 
158).
Restoring macroeconomic balance also appeared to be a priority o f the government. 
Complying with the conditionalities set out in the IMF/World Bank sponsored adjustment 
and/or Extended Fund Facility (EEF) programmes, the military regime undertook 
measures to reduce budget deficits, reform the public sector, restructure the tax system, 
lower inflation, withdraw subsidies on such items as food, fertilizer, and petroleum, 
increase exports, improve the country’s foreign currency reserves, and liberalize the trade 
regime. The government announced different policy measures designed to develop a 
competitive exchange rate policy for the Bangladeshi currency (Rahman 1994: 13-14).
While it appeared that Zia’s major concern was to ensure a rapid recovery of the 
collapsing economy, empirical evidence suggests that his market-oriented reforms were 
driven primarily by his political goals. He was indeed smart enough to realize that his 
military regime suffered from a severe crisis o f legitimacy as its rule was based on 
military might rather than the consent o f the electorate. The need for him to stay in power 
thus demanded that his ‘unconstitutional government’ make efforts to both develop a 
popular support base and generate a new political coalition.
As a pragmatic politician, he clearly understood the inability o f any interventionist 
development strategy to keep him in power for a longer period o f time, let alone expand
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his support-base. From mid-1974, the pressure for liberalizing the economy was 
gradually mounting. The World Bank had already begun to push the Mujib government 
to embark upon a denationalization programme so that the private sector could come to 
play a key role in the economy (Islam, 1977: 246). The assassination o f Mujib in August 
1975 added a new dimension to the growing power o f such external actors. Both the IMF 
and the World Bank saw the demise o f Mujib’s center of left political regime as an 
opportunity to pursue their market-driven economic policies. They didn’t hesitate to use 
Zia’s political vulnerability to the advantage o f the global forces o f production and 
finance. The IMF and the World Bank increased their pressure upon Zia’s military 
regime for immediately abandoning the statist approach adopted by the Mujib regime.
The pressure from key domestic actors, namely the emerging Bengali entrepreneurs, and 
high-level bureaucrats and technocrats, was also increasing as they began to demand an 
immediate improvement in the business environment. Importantly, while most o f these 
actors never lent their support to the AL’s interventionist development strategy, they kept 
their silence until the weakening of Mujib’s popular support. Given the extremely 
disappointing economic results of Mujib’s so-called socialist policies, these traditionally 
powerful actors start to exert their political influence for opening up the economy in 
general, and for stimulating private investment, in particular.
In particular, the use o f economic reform programmes to benefit a small group o f traders 
and industrialists was reflected quite clearly in the privatization o f SOEs, which was the 
major component of Zia’s market liberalization programme. His military regime seemed
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to have done nothing to identify the broad objectives o f the privatization programme. 
Nor did it make any meaningful attempts to justify the government’s decision of 
embarking on its programme of transferring SOEs. What is even more important is that, 
unlike most adjusting nations, Zia and his policy advisors did not seek to generate 
revenues from the sale o f public enterprises. Although it is a common practice that the 
market should determine the value of an SOE and the unit should be sold for cash, most 
SOEs were virtually sold for what Palmer calls “give-away prices” (Palmer 1994: 31). 
The buyers did not have to invest their own money to purchase a public enterprise. 
Subsidized credits from public funds were made readily available to them. Furthermore, 
the entire process o f transferring SOEs to the private sector lacked transparency. The 
government hardly bothered to keep the people informed about the process o f valuation 
and formal negotiations that took place between the state and interested buyers behind 
close doors. Nor did it consult with labor unions to address their concerns. The 
government overlooked the need for launching a public awareness campaign as to the 
goals o f privatization, which eventually contributed to the development o f political 
opposition to economic reforms. Almost all trade union federations demanded the 
scrapping o f the government’s privatization programme.
The govemment-business relationship also reduced the military regime’s ability to 
develop an appropriate legal and regulatory framework essential to enhance competition 
and efficiency of the private sector as well as to protect public interests. This in effect 
encouraged private entrepreneurs to quickly become rich by misusing public resources. 
A considerable number of buyers of SOEs and private investors, who borrowed money
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from different DFIs, emerged as ‘willful defaulters’ as they refused to service their debts. 
Most of them invested money in non-productive and even illegal areas o f business, thus 
making huge unreported profits (Maniruzzaman, 1992: 219). Virtually no legal action 
was taken against them as they continued to enjoy political patronage from General Zia’s 
regime. In other words, corruption began to find institutional foundations during the rule 
of Zia, who himself admitted that “corruption and misuse o f power have led to the 
wasting o f almost 40 per cent of the total resources set apart for development” (Puchkov, 
1989: 171-74). Despite his awareness of such a deplorable situation, he did not take any 
initiatives to either develop a well-defined legal framework or to enforce existing laws in 
order to prevent what Tat Yan Kong calls the “private misappropriation and abuse o f 
public funds” (Kong 1996: 49).
While such a mutually dependent relationship between the government and big business 
severely undermined the ability o f the government’s economic reform programmes to 
live up to its expectations, it indeed enabled Zia to legitimize his unconstitutional regime. 
The political and financial support he received from big business gave him a great deal o f 
confidence in successfully carrying out the so-called civilianization programmes. He 
registered a landslide victory, for instance, in the presidential elections o f 1978, receiving 
76 per cent o f the total votes cast. Likewise, the voters responded positively to his 19- 
point programme in the "Jatiya Sangsad’ (National Parliament) elections in 1979. His 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had no difficulty whatsoever in securing a two-thirds 
majority in the parliament (Khan 1984: 179-80). By contrast, during his five-year rule, 
the opposition remained highly fragmented and therefore failed to build a momentum in
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its fight against military authoritarianism. Part o f the reason for their inability to mobilize 
popular support in general, and to draw support from the business community in 
particular, was that, unlike the ruling party, they did not have any control over the 
established post-independence ‘patronage’ system (Kochaneck, 1993: 229).
The Regime of General Hussain Mohammad Ershad (1982-1990)
General Hussain M. Ershad’s military takeover in March 1982 dramatically changed the 
pace of market-oriented economic reforms in Bangladesh. Soon after the seizure of 
power. General Ershad introduced his reform package through the declaration of his New 
Industrial Policy of 1982 (NIP). Drawing upon Zia’s pro-market reform strategy, this 
economic restructuring programme aimed to accelerate the process o f privatization and 
improve the policy framework mainly to institutionalize the role o f the private sector in 
economic development. Such a programme further limited the scope o f the public sector 
and focused on the urgent need to ensure macroeconomic stability (Government of 
Bangladesh 1983: 87-88).
Hoping to speed up the process of both economic and financial liberalizations, the 
military regime announced its second reform package in 1986, which was popularly 
known as the Revised Industrial Policy o f 1986 (RIP). This reform package was 
designed primarily to further expand the role o f the private sector in general, and to 
stimulate private investment - both local and foreign, in particular. It also was designed 
to strengthen the on-going processes o f adjustment and stabilization. The RIP sought to
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accelerate the process o f privatizing SOEs through a number of measures, notably the 
return of industrial units to their original owners, disinvestment o f industries that were 
left abandoned by their Pakistani owners, and the conversion of SOEs into public limited 
holding companies largely though the selling off the shares to ordinary people and 
employees. As part of its goal of achieving higher levels of efficiency, this reform 
programme promoted the idea that the management o f public sector corporations might 
be handed over to interested private management companies (Government o f Bangladesh 
1988: 70). Ershad’s military regime expected that such a provision would eventually stop 
the drain on the national budget. Apart from these, it also undertook quite a few 
important measures to deregulate the financial sector and to liberalize the trade, 
particularly the import regime.
In brief, unlike Zia’s hesitant approach, Ershad adopted a more focused and aggressive 
path to  the market. H is privatization programme, for instance, w as not limited to  the 
transfer o f either loss-making SOEs or strategically insignificant, small-scale industries. 
It aimed to transfer all sorts o f industrial and commercial enterprises, including a number 
o f key industries in the jute and textile sectors, to the private sector. Within a year o f the 
announcement o f the NIP, Ershad’s military regime transferred the ownership o f 60 large 
jute and textile industries to private investors (Humphrey, 1990: 60). In addition to this, 
the government continued to hand over the ownership o f ‘profit-making’ public 
enterprises. The number of such profit-making units transferred to the private sector rose 
from 32 per cent in 1981 to 78 percent in 1985 (Sobhan and Ahsan 1984: 47).
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This raises an inevitable question: Why did Ershad adopt such a radical approach to the 
market? While most studies blame the international donor community for pressurizing 
the military regime to speed up the country’s on-going market reform programmes, this 
study looks at the internal politico-economic dynamics to identify the factors that led 
Ershad to undertake a relatively aggressive path to the market. After his ascension to 
power, General Ershad dealt with a rather complex political situation that Zia never 
confronted during his entire tenure. Despite Ershad’s promise o f quickly restoring 
democracy, eliminating corruption, bringing back people’s confidence in the 
deteriorating law and order situation, and rebuilding the economy, he found himself in a 
position that was less than welcoming (Hakim 1993: 11)
The rational choice for General Ershad, therefore, was to rely on key domestic and 
external actors for consolidating his position. He knew that the donor community, 
especially the World Bank and the IMF, was unhappy about the slow pace o f reforms. 
Both the World Bank and the IMF made it clear to him that, without a firm commitment 
from his government to restructuring the economy, they would stop pumping any aid 
money into Bangladesh’s troubled economy. The IMF, for instance, suspended its 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme for the apparent failure o f the country to 
conform to all the adjustment-related conditionalities (Rahman, 1994: 14). However, the 
military regime’s quick decision to pursue greater liberalization programmes in general, 
and to meet the terms set out in the articles o f agreement of the IMF in particular, 
restored the confidence o f the donor community. Pressure for economic and financial 
liberalization also came from local actors. The business community was particularly
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anxious to see the immediate removal o f all kinds o f ambiguity from the private sector- 
led development strategy adopted by Zia. Senior military and civil bureaucrats, most of 
them are western-educated and/or trained, were as well calling for the adoption o f a more 
focused approach to the market. As a survival strategy, thus, Ershad sought to build 
political coalitions with these powerful external and internal actors. Having subscribed to 
a structural reform package sponsored by the World Bank and IMF, he went on to build 
alliances with major local players.
Generous donations from big business also allowed him to silence some key opposition 
political parties that threatened the very survival o f his unconstitutional government. As 
Kochanek noted, it was believed that. General Ershad bribed the agitating opposition, 
which had initially refused to participate in any elections under his military regime. The 
immediate success of his buy off strategy was reflected in the suddenly changed mood of 
a number of major opposition parties that stunned the country by announcing their 
decision to take part in the parliamentary elections o f 1986 and 1988, giving his 
legitimization process some sort o f credibility (Kochaneck 1993: 226-27).
In exchange for their generous contributions to the party funds as well as their support for 
military rule. General Ershad allowed the business elites to further accumulate their 
wealth largely through the misappropriation of public resources. His economic 
liberalization programmes became the means by which private entrepreneurs continued to 
enrich themselves. The massive transfer of SOEs to the private sector, for instance, was 
done basically without putting an appropriate mechanism in place. There was no
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standard basis for the valuation of public enterprises. As in Zia’s time, no clear step was 
taken either to generate revenues for the state through the sale o f public enterprises or to 
even make the deals transparent. Such a relaxed environment proved to be extremely 
beneficial for the buyers as it offered them an excellent opportunity to increase their 
wealth by manifolds in a relatively shorter period o f time.
By contrast, the liberalization o f the import regime suddenly created a huge demand for 
foreign goods, ranging from shaving cream, shampoo, cosmetics, utensils, and electronic 
appliances to luxurious cars. This increasing demand helped the traders multiply their 
profits in  tw o specific ways. F irst o f  a 11, taking advantage o f  anundervalued foreign 
exchange rate, they simply flooded the local markets with imported goods and sold them 
at relatively higher prices. And secondly, with the help of senior government officials, 
they widely used the under-invoicing technique mainly to evade appropriate customs 
duties and sales tax, therefore lowering the cost o f imported goods and significantly 
increasing their profits (Maniruzzaman 1992: 218-19). Unofficial imports, in particular 
smuggling, also became a common practice during this period. According to one 
estimate, illegal imports have come to constitute about 18 per cent o f the total imports 
into Bangladesh, owing to loose enforcement of legal provisions (World Bank 1996:7).
Such an absence and/or weak enforcement o f legal terms was also reflected in the 
financial sector, where the problems o f loan default reached a dangerous level. Despite 
his promise to decisively act against the loan defaulters. General Ershad did virtually 
nothing to check this problem. A number of studies suggest that he actually encouraged
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the DFIs to make loans that were highly unlikely to be recovered (Sobhan 1991: 10). The 
World Bank also criticized the government for politically using the DFIs’ lending 
operations. According to a World Bank report,
“The high default rate among Nationalized Commercial Bank (NCB) borrowers has 
occurred because these banks have been poorly managed and have had little incentive to 
make good loans. NCBs have had to make high-risk loans to priority sectors, new 
entrepreneurs, public corporations, ‘sick’ industries and borrowers with political 
influence. They have also had to endure loan forgiveness programmes by the 
government,” (World Bank 1995: 138).
DFl loan defaults doubled in the 1980s, increasing from Tk 5.2 billion in 1982 to Tk 10.5 
in 1990 (Sobhan 1991: 5). It was no wonder that the private sector accounted for 96.5 
per cent o f the total bad lending. O f particular importance is that the debt equity ratio 
reached 90:10 during General Ershad’s nine-year rule (Humphrey 1990: 75).
In addition to weak implementation of existing rules, Ershad’s increasing political 
dependence upon big business also enabled the defaulters to evade legal actions. With 
the intensification of an anti-military movement led by key civil society groups, Ershad 
began to focus on the inclusion o f large business and industrial houses in his coalition. 
Like Zia, he encouraged them to maintain their dominance in the country’s economic and 
political decision-making process. In h is 1 988 cabinet, for example, he  appointed six 
businessmen as ministers (Kochaneck 1993: 223). While the unavailability o f any reliable
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data makes it difficult to provide a clear picture o f business representation in decision­
making, according to one estimate, some 40 per cent o f Jatiya Party (JP) members elected 
to the 1986 ‘Jaitiya Sangsad’ (National Parliament) were big businessmen. 
Representation o f big business in the decision-making process continued to increase 
during the next few years of his rule.
Despite such growing partnerships with big business, the military, and senior civil 
bureaucrats, General Ershad was not able to resolve the severe legitimacy crisis that he 
confronted from the very beginning of his tenure. Failing to overcome growing political 
opposition to his military authoritarian regime, he had to step down in December 1990, 
paving the way for the country’s transition to democracy. Yet the fact cannot be denied 
that, without a solid political support base, he remained in office for full nine years 
largely with the help o f his coalition partners that benefited greatly from the World Bank- 
IMF sponsored market adjustment programmes.
The Regime of Prime Minister Begum Khaldea Zia (1990-1996)
Although Ershad made a departure from his predecessor’s gradual approach to economic 
reform, it was not until the assumption of power by the democratically elected regime of 
Begum Khaleda Zia in 1991 that the country actually witnessed the implementation of a 
radical 1 iberalization p rogramme. U nder t he 1 eadership o f  F inance M inister M. Saifur 
Rahman, the regime outlined its reform priorities through the announcement o f the 
National Industrial Policy (NIP). At the heart of this policy was an attempt to change the
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traditional role of the state in development. By both simplifying investment procedures 
and eliminating the regulatory role o f key governmental agencies, Begum Zia’s 
democratically elected regime formally expressed its desire to assume a promotional 
rather than a regulatory role in facilitating the development o f what it called a healthy 
private sector. The NIP also emphasized the need for implementing a comprehensive 
privatization programme with a focus on the jute sector that continued to operate in the 
red (Bangladesh Bank 1992: 7).
The creation of a solid export base appeared to be a priority o f the BNP regime. It 
undertook measures to diversify the country’s export base, encouraging both local and 
foreign investors to set up export-oriented enterprises. The government offered foreign 
investors tax exemptions on the interest o f foreign loans, royalty, and technical assistance 
fees. It allowed them to freely import machinery and receive long-term credit facilities 
from national financial institutions (World Bank 1992: 82). Local investors were also 
given incentives for undertaking similar export-oriented industrial and commercial 
schemes (DCCI 1997: 20). As part o f its plan to create a competitive export-oriented 
economic structure for the country, the government further accelerated the process of 
freeing up import regulations and removing non-tariff barriers. It announced a relatively 
low tariff regime, sped up the process o f rationalizing the tariff structure, and replaced the 
import sales tax, domestic excise duty, and development surcharge with the Value Added 
Taxation (VAT).
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What, thus, comes into sight is that the pace of economic reforms reached a new height 
under the democratically elected regime o f Begum Khaleda Zia. What explains Begum 
Khaleda Zia’s adoption of such a faster path to the market? Popular assumptions often 
refer to the growing external pressure for liberalization as the primary cause o f the 
introduction of a massive liberalization programme by the BNP regime. There is 
absolutely no doubt that the international actors, especially the World Bank and the IMF, 
were not happy with the slow progress of Bangladesh’s attempt to make a transition to 
the market. On numerous occasions, they expressed, along with other key bilateral donor 
countries and/or organizations, their serious concerns about the inability of the country to 
adopt a more defined approach to reforms. They were particularly critical o f the failure 
o f Ershad’s military regime to develop an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for 
ensuring a better performance of structural economic reforms. Their frustration was 
clearly manifested in the reduced aid commitment in the Aid Group meeting in 1990 
(Kabir 1995: 565). Thus the collapse o f the military regime in December 1990 appeared 
to have made the donors feel relieved as they hoped to use the newly created democratic 
space to the pursuit of a more aggressive reform agenda. Considering market reform as 
the only means to achieving broader goals of economic development, poverty alleviation, 
and employment generation, they began to push the BNP government to speed up its 
economic restructuring programmes (United News of Bangladesh 1994).
This external pressure helps to explain the shift, but only in part. The government’s 
inability to neutralize and/or resist donor pressure resulted from two major factors. First, 
Bangladesh’s historical reliance upon foreign aid virtually made it impossible for the
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BNP regime to ignore donor advice. Despite a decline in the flow of foreign aid into the 
country, between 1990 and 1995 Bangladesh received a total o f $7,564 million US, 
which constituted some 48 per cent of the country’s development expenditure 
(Government of Bangladesh 1997: 8). There is hardly any doubts exit that without such a 
massive v olume o f  e xtemal a id, the B NP w ould f  ind i t a Imost i mpossible to  k eep t he 
wheels o f the economy moving.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the growing government-big business nexus 
either pushed or encouraged Begum Khaleda Zia’s government to accelerate market 
reform programmes. Like the donor community, key business actors believed that 
neither Begum Khaleda Zia’s nor Ershad’s regimes did enough to ensure private 
participation in Bangladesh’s economic development. They were particularly critical of 
successive military governments’ reluctance to allow the private sector to get involved in 
improving infrastructure facilities and activities. They also were disappointed with what 
they called “the slow pace of trade reforms’’, especially the liberalization o f the import 
regime.' Thus, they demanded that the BNP government must take concrete steps to 
further deregulate the economy and promote greater competition. They also asked the 
government for making some ‘actual progress’ in privatizing SOEs (Kabir 1998).
Begum Khaleda Zia’s regime could not do much to neutralize these pressures due to her 
party’s traditional reliance upon big business. Instead of acting independently o f the 
business community, the BNP indeed showed its willingness to establish even closer ties 
with big trading and industrial houses which became crystal clear in the 'Jatiya Sangsad’
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elections o f 1991, when the party deliberately picked up almost half o f its candidates 
from the big business category (MRCB 1991: 6). This was done partly in response to the 
rapidly changing nature o f electoral politics in Bangladesh. From the mid-1980s, it 
increasingly became evident that the chance o f wining would no longer depend upon the 
candidate’s credentials or the party’s election manifesto. The candidate needs to spend 
millions of Tk simply to ensure his/her victory in any elections. Without a lavish display 
o f wealth one can now hardly imagine getting people’s endorsement for holding a public 
office in Bangladesh (Kibria 1994).
The staggering campaign costs encouraged the BNP leadership to nominate the 
‘millionaires’ in the crucial 'Jatiya Sangsad’ elections o f 1991, therefore further 
strengthening its formal relations w ithh ighusiness. T his is no t to  say, however, that 
such a practice was only limited to the BNP. All other major political parties 
participated in the elections of 1991 adopted a similar policy when choosing party 
candidates. Almost 33 per cent o f AL candidates and 33.3 per cent o f Jatiya Party (JP) 
candidates, for example, were from the big business category (MRCB 1991:6). High 
campaign costs, as Hakim noted, “discouraged many formidable aspirants o f low 
financial ability to contest the parliamentary elections’’ (Hakim 1993: 48).
It w as no  wonder that no t only did the BNP emerge as the single 1 argest party in  the 
'Jatiya Sangsad ’ (National Parliament), but also traders and industrialists came out as the 
dominant group in the parliament. The business-industrialist group constituted some 59 
per cent of the newly elected members o f the ‘Jatiya Sangsad,’ reflecting an increase of
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about 95 per cent over a period o f just twelve years. The number o f business 
representatives in the 'Jatiya Sangsad’ increased from 67 in 1973 to 91 in 1979 and 177 
in 1991. Out of the 141 BNP members elected to the parliament of 1991, 94 of them 
were businessmen and industrialists (Maniruzzaman 1992: 216). While businessmen and 
industrialists constituted 28 per cent of the elected BNP members in the 1979 'Jatiya 
Sangsad,’ the same group comprised some 67 percent of the BNP legislators in the 
parliament of 1991. The dominance o f big business in decision-making was also 
reflected in the composition o f Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia’s ministry. Big 
business accounted for some 58 per cent o f the 1991 ministry, which was formed 
following the country’s return to parliamentary democracy. Such an overwhelming 
majority of business legislators and ministers made it evident that big business had 
emerged as the dominant political force in Bangladesh.
During Begum Khaleda Zia’s five-year rule, the business community therefore played a 
central role in implementing a rapid liberalization programme. While the adoption o f a 
fast-track liberalization programme enabled the country to achieve some sort o f macro- 
economic stability, it sparked off popular opposition to reforms, which was manifested in 
the BNP s’ failure in the mayoral elections in Dhaka and Chittagong in 1994. Both of the 
party candidates lost miserably in the election. By choosing opposition candidates, the 
people of Dhaka and Chittagong indicated a strong desire for the development o f a safety 
net for those who were badly hit by the government’s fast-track market reform 
programmes. They expected that such a signal would create the ground for the BNP 
regime to manage distributive conflicts generated by its massive reform programmes.
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The government was not even able to address the distribution issue partly because o f the 
resistance that it faced from big business.
What is perhaps more important to mention is that, business legislators and ministers 
were able to use the liberalization programme to ensure their personal gains in both 
economic and political terms. The increasing presence of big business in decision-making 
put formidable obstacles to the creation o f an appropriate legal and regulatory framework 
necessary to ensure that private entrepreneurs comply with the rules of the game. Using 
their growing political power, businessmen-industrialists prevented the government from 
constructing a well-functioning legal system that would protect consumer rights, make 
contracts enforceable, and stop inappropriate/illegal business practices. Although, under 
donor and public pressure, the democratically elected regime o f Begum Khaleda Zia 
made some attempts to improve the regulatory framework, the lack o f enforcement 
continued to help big business to abuse public resources for private gains. The newly 
established Financial Loan Courts, for instance, made little progress in either recovering 
overdue loans from the defaulters or in ensuring an improved performance of the lending 
institutions. Apart from making the legal provisions for setting up these courts, the 
government hardly did anything to enhance the ability of these courts to act decisively 
against the politically influential defaulters (World Bank 1997: 17).
The absence o f a minimum consensus on economic reforms under a democratic regime 
also contributed to the apparent failure o f adjustment policies to bring about sustained 
politico-economic results. Like Generals Zia and Ershad, the BNP regime evidently
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neglected the importance of generating popular support in favor o f its liberalization 
programme. It made very little effort to hold dialogues with relevant actors, including the 
trade unions and student groups, thus failing to develop a broad-based consensus on 
market reforms. O f particular importance is that, despite widespread expectations. 
Begum Khaleda Zia’s democratically elected regime did not undertake any programmes 
to educate the people as to the costs and benefits o f market reforms. Nor did the 
government make, as mentioned above, any meaningful attempts to resolve the 
distributive conflicts associated with market-oriented reform programmes. Since her 
market reform programmes were not accompanied by any satisfactory mechanisms 
designed to compensate the losers/sufferers, these liberalization initiatives continued to 
generate political resistance.
Considering the government’s privatization programme as a direct threat to the 
livelihoods o f public sector employees, the Sramik Karmachari Oikka Parishad (SKOP) 
an alliance of some fifteen national trade union federations launched a massive anti- 
reform movement. Although it was widely hoped that a democratic government would 
pay more attention to the welfare o f the workers, like Zia and Ershad, Begum Khaleda 
Zia’s regime failed to overcome the workers’ opposition to the on-going liberalization 
programme. This was due largely to the inability o f the government to implement an 
acceptable compensation package that would ensure the protection o f the interests o f the 
workers (World Bank 1994: 49-50). Also, in the absence of an effective reconciliation 
mechanism, the government could not act appropriately and rapidly to resolve labor 
disputes, further contributing to the development o f a highly confrontational labor-
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government relationship in the country, which eventually prompted the fall o f the BNP 
regime.
The Regime of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed (1996-2001)
The coming into power in 1996 by the AL that once refused to let the private sector 
become a partner of the country’s social and economic progress appeared to have made 
no negative impact on Bangladesh’s pursuit o f a free market economy. Structural 
economic reform remained a to p p rio r ity  for SheikhH asina’s reg im ethatreg istered  a 
convincing victory in the parliamentary elections of 1996 held under the supervision o f a 
neutral, caretaker government. Most civil society groups, including the SKOP, that lent 
their unequivocal support to the AL’s election campaign hoped that the AL’s return to 
power would provide them with the political space essential for the initiation o f a 
meaningful search for alternative policy agendas. To the surprise of many activists. 
Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected government refused to even consider the 
adoption of a strategy designed to strike a balance between the private and public sectors. 
In the Fifth Five Year Plan, which was introduced in 1997, the AL government assured 
the donors that it has no plans whatsoever to abandon the export-oriented growth strategy 
originally introduced by General Zia in the late 1970s. Her government promised to 
continue to implement a fast track liberalization programme in order to accelerate 
economic growth (Government of Bangladesh 1997).
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Improving the country’s macro-economic structure remained a major focus o f the AL’s 
reform package. Policies were directed to contain the fiscal deficit, maintain a 
competitive real exchange rate, build a strong foreign exchange reserve, reduce public 
expenditures, and increase government revenues. The government announced various 
policies to ensure that the private sector continued to play a crucial role in the country’s 
economic and social development. It also emphasized the need for transferring SOEs to 
the private sector. Between June 1996 and May 1998, for instance, the Privatization 
Board finalized the selling and/or transfer o f 32 public enterprises (World Bank 1998: 
13). As part o f its plan to facilitate export, the government continued to liberalize the 
trade regime mainly by removing both non-tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions. It 
undertook various measures designed to both reduce tariffs and streamline import 
procedures.
The results o f such liberalization programmes were somewhat encouraging at least in the 
beginning. For much o f the 1990s, the economy grew at 5 per cent a year mainly due to 
the expansion o f the agriculture sector. The country became almost self-sufficient in 
food production as agriculture continued to show a relatively strong performance in the 
late 1990s. The stable macroeconomic environment coupled with the liberalization o f the 
trade regime attracted foreign investment in such areas as energy, infrastructure, and 
export-oriented manufacturing. Inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased 
from $ 83 million US in 1994/95 to $ 630 million US in 1997/98. If the current trend 
continues, the country is expected to receive an average of US$ 800 million o f FDI each 
year (World Bank 1999: 32-34).
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Such relative macroeconomic stability however proved to be unsustainable as the 
economy plunged into a crisis situation in the beginning of the new millennium. The 
growth of the economy dropped from 5.9 per cent in 2000 to almost 5 percent in 2001. 
Per capita GDP growth fell from 4.9 per cent in 2000 to 3.8 percent in 2001. Growth 
rates in all the three sectors, namely industry, agriculture and service, also dropped. 
Consolidated fiscal deficits rose to 8 per cent o f GDP in fiscal year 2001, while domestic 
public debt increased to TK. 400 billion, which is equivalent to 15 per cent o f GDP. 
Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves also hit the lowest level in ten years declining to 
$1.3 billion US in March 2002 (Government o f Bangladesh 2002). The performance of 
the financial sector also remained extremely disappointing as the crisis of debt default 
reached a precarious level. According to an estimate, the non-performing loans 
constituted some “33 per cent o f the combined portfolio of the Nationalized Commercial 
Banks and domestic private banks’’ (World Bank 1998: 15). A major weakness o f the 
financial system also came into light when the capital market crashed in 1996, making 
millions o f investors virtually penniless.
Although the volatility in the external environment was in part responsible for the 
weakening o f Bangladesh’s macroeconomic structure during the late 1990s, the inability 
of S heikh H asina’s d emocratically e lected r egime t o r  egulate the m arket p roperly a Iso 
contributed to the apparent failure o f her government to stabilize the economy. Her 
regime found it particularly difficult to put the country’s financial sector in order because 
of its growing ties with big business and industrialists. The new realities of the post-Cold
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War coupled w ith its desire to come to power largely through the creation of a broad 
based political coalition seemed to have created the basis for the AL leadership in the 
1990s to abandon its center off left political identity. Not only did it adopt a neo-liberal 
approach to economic development, the party, under the leadership o f Sheikh Hasina, 
also began to incorporate traders and/or industrialists into the heart o f its decision-making 
process.
The payoffs of such transformations o f the AL were indeed huge, especially in the 
parliamentary elections of 1996 when it emerged as the majority party w ith some 155 
seats in  the 3 00-member ' Jatiya Sangshad.’ A fter 2 1 years o f  failed attempts, the A L  
finally formed the government that heavily relied upon its new coalition partner big 
business and industrialists. Out o f the 155 MPs elected to the 1996 parliament, 87 o f 
them represented the interests o f business and/or industries. This growing bondage with 
business in effect constrained the government’s ability to maintain its autonomy vis-a- vis 
traders and industrialists. Despite its promise of taking actions against the debt 
defaulters, for instance. Sheikh Hasina’s democratically elected regime was not able to 
reform the legal framework necessary to take punitive measures against both the 
defaulters and the banks. Nor was it able to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory 
capacity o f Bangladesh Bank. The capital markets also suffered from a major crisis o f 
governance owing to the inability of the government to enforce laws. No meaningful 
efforts were made to ensure the accountability o f the stock exchanges.
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The Awamiligue’s (AL) newly developed tie with big business also caused enormous 
tensions in its traditional friendly relationship with labors and public sector employees. 
These two groups were hoping that the return to power by the AL would allow them to 
play a role in the country’s economic policy-making. They soon felt alienated as the 
priorities o f Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina shifted from responding to popular demands 
to the maintenance of its strategic relations with both big business and donors. It, 
therefore, didn’t take long before a sense of frustration returned to civil society, leading 
to the shocking defeat of the AL in the parliamentary elections o f 2001.
The Regime of Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia (2001-2003)
The BNP (Bangladesh National Party)-led ruling alliance of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia 
celebrates today October 10, 2003 its two years in power, mixed with successes and 
failures. This is the second term in the power as a prime minister of Bangladesh after her 
first regime of 1991-1996 though the structure o f her present regime is different from the 
last one, in terms of political alliance as well as success and failure to bring stability in 
the country. As a result the successes and failures o f her present regime are quite different 
from the previous one. Because o f the four- party alliance, there are some differences in 
power sharing and in decision making within these four political parties but the key 
player is the BNP who leading the alliance. The evidences show that in the last two 
years of the present regime there is no fundamental change in political and economic 
trend than the previous one of the same regime. To stay in the power is the main foeus 
rather than governance, socio-political and economic development of the country.
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The BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP) and Islami Oikya Jote (lOJ) 
forged coalition during their movement against the Awami League government and 
contested the October 1, 2001 general election comhinedly. The coalition roared into 
power, bagging over two-thirds seats in parliament. Though there was a commitment to 
form a four-party coalition government, the BJP and the lOJ have not yet been included 
in the cabinet. The BNP has not yet implemented much of its 32-point election pledges.
The pledge to stamp out crime and corruption topped the election manifesto o f the BNP. 
Despite the anti-crime drive like Operation Clean Heart, the country experienced free fall 
o f law and order. And, on Tuesday, October 7, 2003, the Transparency International (TI) 
rated Bangladesh as the most corrupt nation for the third successive year.
Commitments to increase parliamentary seats from 300 to 500 and raise in women's seats 
are yet to be implemented. The BNP was committed to address the women's reserve seat 
issue in the first session of the Sangsad (parliament). Other important issues like 
separation o f judiciary, autonomy of state-owned radio and television, setting up of 
human rights and independent anti-corruption commissions, appointment o f an 
ombudsman, repeal o f Special Powers Act 1974, revival o f zila(District) and upazila(sub- 
district) parishads(Council), nationalization of all non-government primary schools, etc 
have not been executed. In many cases, no initiative was taken at all.
73
However, several other commitments like establishing liberation affairs and expatriates 
welfare ministries, special court to try heinous crimes, repeal o f Public Safety Act, free 
education for girls up to HSC level, etc have already been implemented. The education 
for girl students has been made free up to bachelors' degree level and huge investment 
has been made to improve standard o f education. Copying in examinations has dropped 
down, but leakage of question papers for various exams, including those of public service 
commission, has tarnished the government achievements in the education sector 
significantly.
Corruption, crime, price hike of essentials, government's indecision, excessive 
dependency on bureaucracy and administrative sluggishness have largely marred the 
achievements of the two-year-old government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. It appears 
that corruption has pervaded all sectors as Bangladesh was pegged as the most corrupt 
country in the world for the third straight y ear b y a sleaze watchdog (TI). In  a article 
(Lack o f Law and Order and Suitable Governance by M uhammad Z amir) in the daily 
news paper The Daily Star dated on 10‘̂  October 2003, it says, ‘While government 
officials were stressing on excellent existing investment climate in Bangladesh (in a 
seminar), a group o f Japanese investors in our country were accusing 'government 
officials o f demanding bribes for customs clearance, visa issuance, work permit renewals, 
permission for selling products and other services'. In  addition, other foreign investors 
have stated that they are regularly victims of poor law and order, o f robbery and theft, 
carried out with impunity by 'armed mafia' at construction sites, mostly outside Dhaka’.
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The government took more than 200 steps to improve law and order, but murder, kidnap, 
rape, extortion and a spate of other crimes continued to be the prime concern o f people. 
The setting up o f special tribunals, quick disposal o f sensitive cases and passage of 
tougher laws against acid attacks and repression on women and children have brought 
some relief to people.
Conflicts in policy decision, rivalry among senior ministers, discord between ministers 
and state ministers, conflict between ministers and bureaucrats, inner-grouping and war 
o f attrition among ministers are affecting government activities and presenting a drag on 
development. Apparent dual rule, dominance of a youngsters, lack o f tested leadership, 
inadequate number o f skilled and experienced politicians are slowing down the activities 
of the government that took office with over two-thirds majority. Compared to the 
previous BNP administration that ruled from 1991 to early 1996, the present government 
seems to suffer from serious lack of dynamism as the mainstream leadership has been 
cornered by inexperienced youngsters.
Nowadays, most cabinet ministers and senior BNP policymakers, marginalised in the past 
two years, apparently hesitate to own the government and take responsibility for 
government actions. They feel everything depends on two power centres — one at 
Nakhalpara (the Prime Minister's Office) and the other at Banani (Hawa Bhaban). The 
BNP leaders feel the absence o f experienced and committed leaders like the late Mirza 
Golam Hafiz, Abdus Salam Talukder, ASM Mustafizur Rahman and Prof AQM 
Badruddoza Chowdhury, Majid-ul-Haq and Oli Ahmed in the cabinet.
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In the current cabinet, S ai fur Rahman, Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, Tariqul Islam and Dr 
Khandaker Mosharraf Hossain are showing experience in running the administration as 
well as carrying out political activities. But the majority of others have failed to show 
their capacity in the past two years.
Due to lack o f experienced politicians in the cabinet, the government depends much on 
the bureaucracy, the majority o f whom are on contractual service. Many consider the 
present civil administration less competent than under the past BNP government. 
Weakness in both political leadership and bureaucracy has brought in serious 
sluggishness in state affairs and slowed down the pace o f decision-making. The 
bureaucracy seems to be taking full advantage o f the weakness o f the political leadership.
There was a mini-cabinet under the previous BNP administration and Khaleda took 
important decisions in consultation with senior colleagues, but there is no such entity 
currently. The premier now takes important decisions in consultation with a 'mini­
secretariat' comprised o f five top bureaucrats. Some allege that top secretaries and some 
influential officials at the PMO as well as Hawa Bhaban-based youngsters influence 
government decisions in their favour to advance individual, group business interest.
Inexperience and incompetence o f both politicians and bureaucrats came to light when 19 
out of 20 project proposals placed in a recent Ecnec meeting were rejected because o f 
gross faults and violation of rules and regulations. Most proposals and projects were sent
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back from the cabinet and Ecnec meetings for further scrutiny in the past two years, as 
they were faulty, full o f gross mistakes and not placed properly although they made their 
way to the meetings crossing several steps. A Tk 25 crore project for the facelift of 
Dhaka city was placed at an Ecnec meeting last month without pre-Ecnec approval and 
work on the project started ahead of approval. The Security Exchange Commission has 
been running without its chairman for several months because o f the indecision o f the 
PMO. The finance ministry recommendation for the appointment long back.
Similarly, several Bangladesh missions abroad, including in  the Maldives, Bhutan and 
Nigeria, have been functioning without heads for the last two years due to indecision of 
the government. Many other posts still remain vacant. Appointments to a number of 
foreign posts have been made recently, after long and inexplicable delays.
The declared policy of the government for promotion in the civil administration was 
grossly violated and recommendations o f the Superior Selection Board (SSB) were 
ignored on many occasions allegedly under the influence of a section o f junior and mid­
level officials.The cabinet committee on law and order, some key ministers and officials 
concerned held a dozen of meetings and took a raft o f decisions to check the crime spate, 
but they are yet to be implemented.
The government received a huge amount o f aid and loan for the health sector, but a long- 
running conflict between the minister and the former secretary delayed implementation of 
the funded projects. In most cases, bureaucrats in the name of feasibility study
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unnecessarily delayed the implementation. The health ministry has reportedly turned into 
an extension of pro-BNP Doctors Association o f Bangladesh (DAB). The finance 
minister at a recent meeting expressed serious dissatisfaction as benefits o f investment in 
the sector were not reaching the poor. There was no major purchase in the public sector 
in the past two years because o f faulty proposals and clear violation o f rules. Most 
purchase proposals were rejected at the meetings of the cabinet committee on economic 
affairs.
Most ministries are not even capable of preparing their tender documents for 
development projects and purchases in which international bidders may take interest. 
Foreign bidders, especially the internationally renowned companies, do not participate in 
official tenders for supply of equipment as most specimens and quotations o f the 
documents remain faulty. Besides, repeated cancellation of tenders discourages foreign 
and reputed local firms.
The government miserably failed to purchase urgently needed equipment for Bangladesh 
Television, Chittagong Port and some other organisations because o f faulty tender 
documents, lack o f response by reputed foreign companies and cancellation of 
bidding.The government also feels the shortage of skilled negotiators who can handle 
national and international issues properly. There is virtually no tangible achievement of 
the government in bilateral, regional and international negotiations.
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However, in the context of successful story, Bangladesh, according to the latest Human 
Development Report, has graduated from the category of “Lowest Human Development” 
to "Medium Human Development”. The Country Performance Rating o f Bangladesh, 
according to World Bank estimates, has improved very significantly since the new 
Government took over. GDP growth in 2002- 2003 was around 5.3 percent; inflation was 
contained to about five percent. In last two years, foreign exchange reserves have been 
doubled from a disastrously low level inherited by the present Government. Floating 
exchange regime has been successfully introduced. Reversing the trend o f negative 
growth last year, exports grew at around nine percent. The fiscal deficit has been 
significantly curtailed. The benefits of these reforms cannot be reaped fully unless 
investment in physical and social infrastructure could be accelerated. But in reality, the 
GDP growth, containment of inflation rate, export growth, stable fiscal deficit all these 
factors do not reflect significantly the vas picture o f the poor. Unemployment, corruption, 
poverty and lack of good governance are the everyday picture o f the country. Under the 
direction o f the IMF and the World Bank the regime started privatization so many State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE) in a speedy way. As a result, hundreds o f workers are 
becoming unemployed eventually.
Even after the Cancun talks failed policymakers in Bangladesh are yet to realize it is 
agriculture that is the locomotive of economic growth. We have very little subsidy for 
agriculture and even less for its export. In the past when it was raised a finance minister 
had quite non-chalantly said that we do not provide subsidies for raw material export. Is 
agricultural products raw material? Is there no value addition when a crop is planted or 
harvested? According to our collective ignorance, no, it is not. The item he was referring
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to was nothing other than jute. Even in the Pakistan period its export was subsidized by 
so-ealled bonus vouchers, a form of subsidy. It was left to the wisecracks in Bangladesh 
to stop subsidizing its jute exports and destroy the industry and ruin the rural economy. 
Since then the jute industry has collapsed and many people have been rendered jobless. 
There is not an iota of sympathy for this. On the contrary the government has claimed 
that the closure o f the nation's biggest jute mill, the Adamjee Jute Mills, was a great 
success for it! Due to the agitation of labour unions some other jute mills which were 
scheduled to be closed has been backtracked. So, in the context o f Bangladesh political 
culture, we can say that this regime is also as the ‘tow side of the same coin’.
The Aid Scenario of Bangladesh
External assistance has been of critical importance for the economic development of 
Bangladesh. During the twenty-six years o f its existence Bangladesh received $29 billion 
of external aid.' In the early years of Bangladesh's gaining of statehood foreign assistance 
was mostly geared towards providing relief and rehabilitating o f the war affected people. 
Since mid-1973 external resources have been mobilized for the importation of food 
grains and other commodities and the financing of development projects envisaged under 
the Five-Year Plans (FYP). The over dependence of Bangladesh's economy on external 
assistance has been generally explained by a number o f economists in terms o f a two gap 
model. The country's inability to generate enough savings for investment, on the one 
hand, and earn adequate foreign exchange to pay for imports, on the other, has
80
necessitated a continuing flow of foreign aid. The overall aid scenario can be described in 
the following terms:
A id flow s to Bangladesh
Foreign aid to Bangladesh has officially been categorized under three main headings: 
Project Aid, Commodity Aid and Food Aid. Project Aid constituted half o f the $29.04bln 
of foreign assistance that Bangladesh received so far. Projects under the Annual 
Development Plan (ADP) are generally financed under Project Aid. Commodity Aid is 
the type o f aid that is spent for the procurement o f intermediate inputs and raw materials.^ 
As o f 1972 Commodity Aid constituted 31.51% of the total aid volume to Bangladesh. 
Moreover, commodity aid generates counterpart funding through sales. This counterpart 
fund is channelled in the form of local resources in the implementation of ADP projects. 
Food Aid constituted 18.32% of the total aid received'*^.
Table 3.1: Structure of Foreign Aid Flow to Bangladesh (1971/72-1994/5) (US$ M)
Type Grant Loan Total








Project Aid 536&59 9208.333 14568.923
(37.83) (61.90) (50.16)
Total 14168.577 14875.759 29044.336
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (1997)
® While estimating commodity aid items such as edible oil and fertilizer and programme aid are also 
included. However, it excludes commodities acquired under Project Aid 
In estimation costs o f transport, storage and distribution are included
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The Changing Pattern of Foreign Aid
Commitment and Disbursement
There has been a difference between aid commitment and disbursement figures. 
Commitment is a firm obligation expressed by an agreement or equivalent contract for its 
provision o f resources,”  while disbursement is the actual release o f funds under an 
agreement. U ntil 1 995 total foreign aid committed to  B angladesb amounted $ 35.13bln 
but the amount actually disbursed stood at $29.01bln. The percentage o f disbursement of 
food, commodity and project aid to commitment was 98.51, 96.62 and 71.79 respectively. 
Economic R dations Division ( ERD) estimates tbat Bangladesb bas $ 6.23bln in  its aid 
pipeline as of July 1995.
Table 3.2: Commitment and Disbursement (In US$ Bln)
Commitment Disbursement
Grant Loan Total Grant Loan Total
Flood aid 4.63 0.76 5.39 4.55 0.76 5.31
Commodity
Aid
4.38 5.08 9.46 4.24 4.90 9.14
Project Aid 6.86 13.42 20.28 5.36 9.20 14.56
Total 15.87 19.26 35.13 14.15 14.86 29.01
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (1988)
11 It lays out the specified amount and financial terms and conditions and the specific purpose for which 
loan is disbursed difference between commitment and disbursement over the last 26 years.
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Sectoral Allocation
With respect to sectoral allocation o f foreign aid one would see its obvious project aid 
orientation. Power received the largest allocation $2788.9 (19.14%), followed by 
transport and communication $2627.8 (18.07%). Other infrastructural development 
projects (water, flood control, housing and cyclone shelters) constitute the third largest 
sector accounting for $2125.8 (14.59%). Agriculture and rural development accounted 
for 12.35% of foreign aid allocation. It is important to note that human development 
sectors (health, education etc.) accounted for only 12.57% of the total resources 
mobilized. There is a general bias towards large-scale projects on one hand, and also 
towards projects, which demand more external inputs, on the other.
It would appear from sectoral allocation of foreign aid over time that agriculture and rural 
development on an average accounted for about 13% of the total allocation between 
1981-85 to 1991-95 period as shown in table 3 below. Water and flood control sector has 
registered a steady increase o f 11.61% in 1981-85 to 16.82% in 1991-95, whole power 
sector average 26.86% during that period. It is worth noting that the share o f the 
industrial sector registered a major decline from 22.42% in 1976-8(3 to a mere 4.67% 
Such a sharp fall might have links with the change in policy framework towards private 
sector promotion.
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Table 3.3: Sectoral Disbursement of Project aid (cumulative)
Sectors Amount in US$m Percentage
Power 2788.8 19.14
Transportation and Communication 2627.8 18.04
Water, flood control, physical planning, housing, 
cyclone shelters
2125.8 14.59
Agriculture and Rural Development I800.I 12.35
Industries 1565.8 10.75
Health and Population Control 1043.1 7.16
Oil, Gas and Natural Resources 932.0 6.39
Science, education, religion, sports, culture, 
social welfare, women, youth, labour and mass 
media
802.8 5.51
Public Administration 107.9 0.74
Privates'" 774.7 5.32
Total 14568.9 100.00
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (2002)
In the initial years when the country was recovering from the devastation o f the war there 
was an overwhelming grant component in foreign assistance. This is reflected in 90.5% 
grant component o f the total aid, as against 9.5% of loans. However, between 1980/1 to 
1994/5 period grants constituted 40 to 51% of the total aid package. If one compares the 
three categories o f aid, then one finds that the share o f project aid is on the increase while 
food and commodity aid, which are mostly grants, have registered a decrease. The 
declining share o f grant indicated the country's diminishing access to concessional
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resource flow. This reflected increasing competition for aid money by larger number of 
countries, particularly from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
Sources o f Aid
The major sources o f official aid are DAC countries, OPEC countries and the multilateral 
financing institutions, e.g.. World Bank EU.
Grant and Loan Components
Table 3.4: Changing Pattern of Aid Disbursement (In Percentage) 12
Disbursement 1971/2 1975/6 1980/81 1985/6 1990/91 1994/5 1971/94
Grant 90.5 29.2 51.8 41.8 48 51.2 49
Loan 9.5 70.8 48̂ % 58.2 52 48.8 51
Source
Bilateral 85.7 71.4 72.1 47.9 39.3 52.8 60.1
Multilateral 14.3 28.6 27.9 52.1 60.7 47.2 39.9
Source: Adapted from Huq (1999)
Bilateral aid shows a progressive declining trend. Between 1971/2 and 1980/1 bilateral 
source accounted for 72 to 86%, whereas the figure has oscillated between 47 to 60% in
All loans and grants, which are categorized according to economic sector classification in Annual 
Development Programme (ADP).
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the last ten years. However, in aggregate terms 39.9 percent o f external assistance has 
been provided by multilateral sources and the rest 60.1 percent from bilateral sources.
Types o f  aid
Table 3.5: Changing Pattern as to Source and Types of Aid
Year
Project Aid
Food Aid Commodity Aid
1980-85 




5480.4 (65.9) 886.0 (10.7) 1950.4(23.5)
Source: Adapted from Huq (1999)
The above table provides a general picture about the declining share o f food aid and 
commodity aid components with the concomitant rise in project aid. Over the last ten 
years’ share o f food aid has dropped from 19.7% (1980-5) to a mere 10.7% and that of 
commodity aid from 35 to 23.5%. The share of project aid has risen from 45% to 65.9% 
in the matching period.
A id by source
A large number o f countries contribute to Bangladesh’s aid basket. The list includes 
OECD countries such as Japan, USA and the European countries, OPEC states and other 
countries such as India, China and Russia. A host o f multilateral such as the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), European Union, World Bank in addition to the UN system 
are also Bangladesh’s partners in development (see table 6).
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Table 3.6: Pattern of Disbursement of 10 Major Donors
Donors Food Commodity Project Grant (%) L oan(%) Total
















































































Source: Adapted from Huq (1999)
Table 6 provides a list o f selected countries/agencies that have contributed more than 
$100m in any o f the categories o f aid to Bangladesh. The above Table shows that 
cumulative disbursement of project aid has been the highest as far as the ten major donors 
are concerned US$ 5727.4m, followed by commodity aid o f $5401.8m. The trend is 
similar in case o f four major multilateral donors as well, project aid accounting for 
$6197. Im, commodity aid $2904.5m and food aid $1530.7m. However, in the latter case
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project aid far outweighs commodity aid. By far the United States and Canada are the 
most important donors of food aid and i t  is  this component that accounts for am ajo r 
share of their aid packages to Bangladesh. O f the multilateral agencies, the UN system 
provided the highest amount o f food aid to Bangladesh, followed by EU. Both in project 
and commodity aid, Japan contributed the highest dollar amount among bilateral donors, 
and the IDA among multilateral donors. If one looks into the grant and loan proportions, 
it is like-minded group of countries (Canada, Netherlands, Sweden and Norway) whose 
contribution is higher in grant form than loan. Grants constitutes 100% of the Norwegian, 
99.1% of the Canadian, 98.8% of the Swedish and 91% of the Dutch aid to Bangladesh. 
O f the multilateral agencies 100% of the UN system's and 94.5% of EU's aid channelled 
to the country was grant. Grants also constitute more than 93%, 77% and 75% of UK's, 
Germany's and US's aid package to Bangladesh respectively.
Though loans make-up more than 60% of the Japanese aid, the government o f Japan 
provides an annual grant equivalent to a debt service payments on Japanese loans paid 
during the Japanese fiscal year (April-March)'^ About 100% of the IDA and the ADB 
loans, for o bvious r easons, a re 1 oans. W ith an  o verwhelming c omponent o f  grants t he 
above table clearly indicates that over the years Bangladesh has been favourably treated 
by donors. The table shows that four OECD countries (Canada, Germany, Japan and US 
have all made major contributions in all three categories of aid. Japan has so far made 
significant contribution in commodity and project aid packages, while the US is the most
The amounts paid are deposited in a bank account and these amounts plus interest are resumed in two 
cash installments during the subsequent year for import financing and since 1990 for local counterpart 
funds project financing.
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important donor o f food aid. O f other countries Saudi Arabia and India have both 
contributed more than $100m to each of the categories. EU and UN system are the two 
multilateral sources that have made similar contributions. IDA, the soft loan window of 
the World Bank has so far mobilized a major share of the multilateral aid under 
commodity and project aid programmes while the Asian Development Bank provided 
more than $2.5bln in project aid.
D ebt Situation
Table 3.7: Statement of External Debt (1971/72 - 1994/95) US$ in million
Year Outstanding Disbursement Debt Service Debt
1971-5 859.6 88.3 792.8
1975-80 2387.6 367.6 3088.8
1980-85 2829.2 611.0 5267.4
1985-90 4549.6 1300.9 9809.4
1990-95 4299.4 1848.3 15946.6
Total 14925.4 4266.1 15946.6
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (1997)
The above table presents a five-year situation of external debt. There has been a steady 
increase in disbursement until 1980-85 period. Disbursement sharply increased by 60% in
1985-90 period before a drop of 5.5 % in 1990-95. With an increasing number o f debts 
maturing the amount paid in 1990-95 period stood at $467.9m. It is interesting to note 
that in  the year 1 994-95 the total amount o f  a id  disbursed w as $ 849m, whole amount 
spent on debt servicing was a staggering $467.9m. The cumulative outstanding debt until 
June 30, 1995 amounted to $ 15.94b. The above table indicates that with increase in loan 
component and with maturity o f outstanding loans there has been a five-fold rise in total 
debt service in the two-decade period, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s.
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Table 3.8: Debt Service Pattern







Remittance Total TDS as % 
of export 
o f good & 
services
1974/75 100.9 335.0 96.0 35.0 486.0 20.8
1979/80 219.8 743.0 254.0 249.0 1246.0 17.6
1984/85 4760 971.0 301.0 439.0 1711.0 27.8
1989/90 570.0 1524.0 446.0 761.0 2731.0 20.9
1994/95 552.1 3473.0 819.0 1198.0 5490.0 10.1
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (1997)
However, in the same period there has been a drop of about 50% in total debt service as 
percentage to  export o f  goods and services. One m ay note that the  figure registered a 
steady rise in ID S  up to mid-1980s. In the last decade, major increase in exports, 
particularly in apparel, and remittance of Bangladeshi workers from abroad had 
contributed considerably to the lowering ratio o f TDS/export o f goods and services.
Table 3.9: Exchange Rates Per US$
Currency 1979-80 1984-85 1989-90 1994-95
SDR 1.29 1.00 0.77 0.67
Yen 230.00 235.00 166.67 94.11
Canada $ 1.00 1.15 1.17 1.38
British Pound 0.43 0.67 0.59 0.63
DM 2.00 3.00 1.67 1.49
Source: Adapted from the Government o f  Bangladesh (2002)
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Fluctuations in exchange rates have major ramifications in the valuation o f foreign aid. It 
also has a direct bearing on the cost of aid. The above table suggests that as against dollar 
currency rates have fluctuated in a mixed way. IDA and Japan are two major sourees of 
credit for Bangladesh. In that context, rise in value of SDR and Yen against dollar, means 
Bangladesh has to pay more while repaying the loans. In case o f the Yen there has been 
more than 125% depreciation against the US dollar and in case of the SDR the 
depreciation rate is a little less than 100%. While value o f Japanese aid in terms o f US 
dollar shows a decline, the debt servicing liability increased. The Deutsche Mark has also 
registered an increase in value over the period. However, there has been a decline in 
value of Canadian dollar and pound sterling against US dollar.
Aid Mobilization Through the NGOs
In the immediate wake o f  independence o f Bangladesh, NGOs were involved in relief 
and rehabilitation work and reconstruction o f the war devastated economy. Gradually the 
NGO sector has emerged as an important actor in the overall development process o f the 
country. At present NGOs are involved in almost all sectors o f development, health, 
family planning, education, training, income generation, agriculture, fisheries, legal aid 
etc. All these activities are conducted under the broad rubric o f poverty alleviation and 
development o f the poor. In 1995 there were 2 0 ,0 0 0  NGOs in Bangladesh. O f them 
about 900 obtained direct foreign funding and were registered with the NGO Affairs 
Bureau. In 1992 about 20% of annual aid flow has been channelled through NGOs. Up to
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December 1994, 745 NGOs (124 foreign and 621 local) received foreign assistanee worth
Tk.60,380,000,000 for 2499 approved projects 14
Table 3.10: Flow of Foreign Grant Fnnd Through the NGO Affairs Bureau
Period Projects Financed Funds Released







Source: Adapted from Huq (1999)
Until the 1980s NGOs received most o f their external funding from international NGOs, 
foundations and corporations. Bilateral donors also provided resources to the NGOs. It 
was from the 1980s that multilateral donors have begun showing keen interest on NGOs 
and encouraged NGOs to collaborate with the government in projects funded by them. 
Accordingly, NGOs have participated in some large-scale development projects, such as 
the Jamuna Bridge Project, the Fourth Population and Health Projeet, the Third Fisheries 
Project. It may be noted that the multilateral donor funded projects in which NGOs are 
actively engaged in, do not get accounted for in the NGOAB reeord. In the last few years 
16 to 18% of the annual aid flow to Bangladesh has been channelled through the NGO
All these figures are from Siddiqui (1995).
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sector. NGO Bureau reports that the gross amount mobilized through this sector during 
1995 was US$ 156.77m. Another emerging trend is the growing share o f FDI in the 
external resource flow. An important feature of NGO finance in Bangladesh is that it is 
mainly controlled by a section of large NGOs.
One estimate suggests that in 1992, 30 large NGOs have received 80% of the total 
foreign funds, channelled in this sector, 60% of this amount was controlled by eight of 
the large NGOs.8 Another study suggests that 68% of the total foreign fund released by 
NGOAB in 1993-94 was spent by ten leading national NGOs.'^ In the context of 
Bangladesh donors feel that it is extremely difficult to reach the poor through the existing 
government machinery. This is because of corruption, misappropriation o f funds, 
overlapping of power of various government bodies, bureaucratic redtape, etc.
In this context, donors think that channelling funds through NGOs is justifiable because 
NGOs (a) are geared specifically to the needs of the poor, (b) operate at a low cost, (c) 
can ensure beneficiary participation, (d) are relatively free from bureaucratic hierarchy, 
and (e) are flexible and innovative in their approach. Donors also consistently influence 
the government to establish a favourable public policy framework for the NGOs.'®
World Bank, Pursuing Common Goals(\996. p.45) and Bangladesh: Evolution o f  Netherlands Funded 
NGOs, 1972-1996. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hague, 1998 
Siddiqui (1992 op.cit., 117)
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Conditional Aid Situations in Bangladesh
Bilateral donors are guided by policy-making consideration in their home countries. 
Questions such as ‘promoting democracy’ and ‘market mechanism’ are often pushed by 
national legislatures and in that respect their aid officials have little flexibility. 
Conditionalities are imposed by multilateral donors as well. With new claimants for the 
soft loan (particularly IDA money) the multilateral donors, like their bilateral 
counterparts, look for efficient organization and capable government for proper use o f the 
aid. They also prefer governments who have clear ideas and better programmes for the 
use o f aid. Donors view that limited aid absorptive capacity due to ill-conceived project 
planning, bureaucratic inefficiency and lack o f co-ordination between various agencies, 
in the past, has acted as a major disincentive in increasing the volume of aid to the 
country. Bangladesh officials, of course, insist that decline in the quality o f aid and 
imposition of more stringent conditionalities are major issues and are concern for them. 
They argue that changes in the modality o f commodity aid disbursement, tied to domestic 
sources o f aid disbursing country, severely undermine the quality o f aid. In addition, 
supply-based technical assistance, instead of being demand driven, also erodes the quality 
of aid. The Third Five-year plan observes, one o f the difficult problems associated with 
technical assistance is a synthesis between donor preference and recipient priority. The 
problems of diverse priority, time frame and attitudes and preferences on many occasions 
may turn out to be critical.
Normally conditionalities are imposed multilaterally, they come not as requests but as 
directives. Human rights, environment and transparency are some o f the relatively newer
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elements in conditionality. With respect to conditionality there have been mixed 
responses. Conditionalities may be imposed on different levels: project, sectoral or macro 
economic. For projects like power plant it deals with where it will be located, who will be 
implementing them, what will be the work schedule and how the product will be sold, 
who will manage the facility, supply o f inputs, operation and maintenance, pricing 
delivery o f services flowing from the project etc. For sectoral issues like power sector it 
involves input pricing, sector management (public and private) distribution system 
(whether there will be monopoly or competition), control of decisions etc. For macro- 
economic issues money supply, inflation, trade pattern, exchange rate, budget etc. are 
important considerations.
In the years between 1987-95 conditionalities were imposed on commodity aid or project 
aid, under structural adjustment credit and concessionary loans. In this period Bangladesh 
accepted commodity aid, which were ‘stringent, embarrassing and bitter in nature’. In
1986-87 the country’s foreign currency reserve situation was very low and development 
budget was totally dependent on foreign aid. Government was in a difficult situation and 
in order to stabilize balance of payments situation it accepted structural adjustment loans. 
Most of the structural adjustment loan agreements were signed in this period.
Under the scheme the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) disbursed 
cash money in exchange of fulfillment of some tough conditions to reform the financial, 
energy, agriculture, public resource management, jute and other industries sector. 
Bangladesh had little choice than accepting what the donors proposed. There had been
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situations where new conditions were attached at the disbursing stage. Reserve positions 
had improved following acceptance of first tranche. But, severe complications followed. 
Over time the nature o f conditionalities changed from project to sectoral in the form of 
institutional reforms. Questions were raised about system loss. The macro-economic 
scenario was also bleak. Government was spending more than it could afford. This 
invited macro-economic conditionalities on the government revenue base, government 
expenditure, exchange rate mechanism etc. and was directed to sustainable macro- 
economic stability. During 1987-89 period as all aid were linked with sectoral and macro- 
economic conditionalities, government accepted such conditionalities knowing full well 
that these could not be implemented. However, post-1991 democratic government was 
under pressure to implement policies agreed upon by the predecessor government. It is at 
the Annual Aid Group Meetings (AGM) that conditionalities are suggested. Individual 
donors place their conditions at bilateral meetings. Major donors like Japan and Germany 
disposed towards a sound macro-economic management. The world Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) certify the government’s level o f implementation of 
conditionalities agreed upon. From 1991-92, with the improvement in overall economic 
situation Bangladesh became more selective in accepting structural adjustment credit. 
Pros and cons o f loan agreements are carefully assessed. There had been instances when 
Bangladesh had to cancel agreements, e.g., the second industrial credit.
With a better reserve situation the government felt the strength to do so. In cases where 
Bangladesh has shown keen interest in getting funds for projects, it evoked strict 
conditions. The Jamuna Bridge Project is a major case in point where loans were
96
accepted with severe conditions. Conditions relating to compensation and resettlement 
were particularly stringent. To cater to such conditions amendments to the land 
acquisition law had to be made. One may argue that political commitment o f the 
government to the Jamuna project had led to its acceptance o f such hard conditions. 
GOB’s responses to conditionalities are determined by two factors, political and 
economic. In some instances the government has been able successful to implement the 
macro-economy related conditionalities. This has been reflected in lower interest rate and 
lower inflation rate during in the mid-1990s. However, the problem becomes acute when 
it involves trimming down of state corporations. Politically,it becomes very difficult on 
the part o f the government to implement conditionalities which demand large scale 
retrenchment. During the 1970s aid received was mainly in the form of food aid and 
commodity aid. In the 1980s aid came with moderate conditionalities. In the latter half of 
1980s conditionalities became tough as mismanagement and corruption became very 
obvious. As national reserve depleted the government became more vulnerable to tough 
structural programs conditionalities. The misappropriation of 1988 flood relief goods also 
invited severely strict monitoring of government utilization o f aid money. There have 
been occasions when the head of the state’s signature was called into question. Normally 
the government has no choice but to accept conditionalities. Under the structural 
adjustment program the government qualifies to receive cash money under different 
tranches. For release o f money under each tranche that government has to certify that it 
has met the conditions led down. Although the terms for project level conditions are 
generally easy compared to SAR programs, much time is wasted in meeting donors’ 
conditions and the project commencement is delayed. In mid-June 1990 foreign exchange
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reserve declined to the low level o f $350m as against the usual $500m. The only ray o f 
hope was release o f a tranche o f aid by the Japanese, which would take the figure just 
above the $500m mark. When Japan was requested to release the amount it informed that 
only on the World Bank’s advice she could do so. The Bank, in its turn, demanded 
incorporation o f certain fiscal measures pertaining to tax liberalization in the national 
budget, due to be announced in 2/3 days time. The government agreed but the Bank 
stated that the only after the presentation of the budget Japan will be advised to release 
the tranche. The budget was presented at 4 p. m. in the Parliament and the relevant 
section of the minister’s budget speech was faxed to the World Bank. At mid-night 
Bangladesh time a meeting was held in Washington DC at the Bank. On 16‘*’ June Japan 
release the tranche following an agreement signed by the Bangladesh Ambassador in 
Tokyo. Bangladesh had to send an advance authorization letter from the president so that 
the Ambassador could sign the document. The donors’ treatment to government varied 
over conditionalities. The 1991 aid group meeting was very sympathetic to the new 
Bangladesh g ovemment. In  the preceding year’s negotiations, B angladesh was ‘put on 
the dock’ and donors did not commit any aid. The 1991 negotiations were protractive, but 
more accommodative about tax and tariff liberalization. A major rationale for imposing 
conditionalities on the part of the donors is that they have to justify their performance to 
their own taxpayers.
An area o f major concern for donors is the accumulated loss o f public sector corporations 
which accounts for $600m per year. The World Bank/IMF want the government to down 
scale its involvement and retrench unnecessary workers, which the government had
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earlier agreed to, but has been reticent in implementing it for political reasons. The Dutch 
government decided not to disburse second installment o f loan under the jute industries 
restructuring program because of the government’s performance. Argues the concerned 
Dutch official, “we tried to explain to the government that better not reform than half- 
reform”. Japan insists that she does not impose conditionalities as much as other donors 
do but reiterates that system losses in the power sector have to be reduced before Japan 
resumes aid in any major way. Frustration with energy ministry’s performance is 
reflected when the Ambassador states that the “the ministry’s sense o f urgency is 
different from ours” . Both donors and recipients state that ultimately
It may be noted that Japan did not totally stop fund the power sector projects, as other 
donors had done, acceptance of conditionalities rests with the recipient country, as it may 
always not proceed with investments if  they regard conditions set by donors as 
unreasonable. 13th Gob had serious reservations about natural resource sector 
conditionalities. When Bangladesh’s reservations were explained, donors were convinced 
and three paragraphs were dropped form the project agreement. 14 In order to avert 
conditionalities the recipient must be pro-active in aid negotiations. The weaker the 
agency, the more are the conditionalities attached to the projects. The weaker is 
preparedness of the Government (with adequate data, statistics), the weaker the 
professional approach to issues, the weaker the analytical capacity of our policy-making 
agencies, the more will be the conditionalities. In other words, the weaker the 
administration, the more will be the conditionalities. We can take a positive attitude 
towards conditionalities by taking action ourselves and thus preempt the donors.
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If conditionalities are properly designed with full professional participation o f our 
agencies, these should have positive impact on sectoral performance. For policy design 
there has to be adequate professional competence within the government and coherent co­
ordination between economic ministries. Otherwise, donors will fill the gap. Policy 
reforms at the government’s own initiative is likely to have a positive impact on resource 
flow from aid sources. Properly designed conditionalities (targets) have to be imposed by 
the Ministry o f Finance (and Planning) on other ministries, the ministries, in their turn, 
have to impose targets and conditionalities on their agencies\corporations for better 
performance-and thus preempt the donors-as far as project conditionalities are concerned. 
17̂  ̂ But there are instances where project conditionalities tend to clash with broader 
donor guidelines. For example, the government is under constant pressure o f the donors 
to reduce its size. However for the social forestry project, it ahs been urged by the donor 
agencies to absorb personnel who have been temporarily appointed. This form of duality 
puts the government in difficult situation. 18*'’ Again, increase in revenue generation is an 
important macro-conditionality. Meeting such condition through additional taxation, 
affects the general investment climate in the country.
Donors assume conditions are not met because Government o f Bangladesh (GoB) does 
not want to, or because they can’t. Many believe that conditions attached to grants 
impose a considerable burden. Conditions are inappropriate and impossible to fulfill: For 
example one European bilateral offered assistance to rehabilitate ferries -  on condition 
the ferries were all privatized. However, regardless of the debates o f whether 
privatization enhances efficiency, not all the ferries are profitable and private companies 
are reluctant to be involved in their operation. It is advised from the GoB side that the
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donor and GoB together should discuss the options to increase efficiency, rather than the 
donor “dictating a solution” which may not necessarily improve service delivery. Another 
example is cited is the rehahilitation o f locomotives on the Bangladesh railway. As the 
railway has some -  but not enough -  o f its own resources, assistance from donors was 
requested, hut donors approached would only offer assistance if  private sector 
involvement increased. Further, the donors insisted on including their own experts when 
there were sufficient local experts. Again, some parts o f the railway are not profitable and 
not possible to privatise -  even if  GoB actually wanted to adopt such a policy. GoB 
would like to discuss conditions and proposals, hut many felt donors are not flexible and 
imply “accept or we go elsewhere” -  which o f course gives the GoB an incentive to look 
elsewhere and an incentive to discourage donor coordination or harmonisation. 
Disbursement delays if  conditions are not met. The government is not in a position to 
fulfil the conditions but signs finance agreements anyway as it wants funds. However on 
several occasions, the conditions have not been met, disbursement stops and the project 
stall. Conditions set to change the “basic rules o f GoB” are not appreciated. Some 
conditions relate to general matters such as government reform, rather than specifically to 
the project’s objectives. While it is  noted that conditions are often used to ‘persuade’ 
governments to undertake policy changes that donors feel would be beneficial to the 
country, several officials believed attaching general conditions was inappropriate. Trying 
to push through reforms ‘by the back door,’ rather than through formal discussions on 
reforms, was not believed to encourage positive relations between donors and the 
government and actually distracts government from itself addressing underlying 
problems. Consequences may not be acceptable: Often pre-project conditions are set, for
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example to ensure a project manager is employed before the implementation begins. 
However GoB is wary about such pre-conditions as once a position is created within the 
civil service, it is very difficult to remove. If the project collapses, the government must 
still pay the managers’ salary, but does not receive funding to cover such costs.
In relation to technical assistance, that whiles a welcome form of aid, the technology that 
is offered at affordable rates is often obsolete, leaving Bangladesh with hidden costs at 
the operational level and with problems o f maintenance and r eplacement. More up-to- 
date technology, which is likely to have a greater impact on development, is expensive, 
as it must be sourced from the donor country. GoB officials believe it is feasible to 
reduce the proportion of project funds allocated to technical assistance, and focus on the 
best value use of aid, by allowing a free choice of supplier. For example, modem 
technology is often cheaper when sourced from other developing countries.
Conclusion
This study finds little empirical evidence to support the widely held assumption that pro­
market reforms were undertaken in Bangladesh in order to improve either its 
macroeconomic performance or to improve its poverty conditions. Successive regimes, 
both civilian and military, implemented various types of economic liberalization 
programmes, including the transfer of SOEs to the private sector, reforming the financial 
sector, and liberalizing the trade and import regimes primarily to develop political 
coalitions with both external and internal key actors. In particular, the two military
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regimes o f Zia and Ershad used economic reform programmes largely as a tool to both 
legitimize and consolidate their unconstitutional power base. Both o f them sought to 
develop political alliances with senior bureaucrats, businessmen, and industrialists mainly 
through their reform measures.
This research discovers that Generals Zia and Ershad allowed big business to emerge as a 
major player in national decision-making, which in turn adversely affected the state’s 
ability to either enforce contracts or to develop a mechanism for redistributing assets. 
Both Generals also encouraged, albeit indirectly, the country’s financial and economic 
elites to accumulate huge wealth through the abuse of scarce public resources. In return, 
not only did big business lend its political support to the military authoritarian regimes’ 
legitimization programmes, perhaps more importantly, businessmen and industrialists 
also contributed generously to the coffers of the ruling BNP and JP, helping them to 
expand their political support base. Even under the democratically elected regimes o f 
both Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, economic reforms did not appear to be a 
means of improving either the performance of the economy or the living standards for the 
majority. Instead, economic liberalization programmes were used primarily to protect 
and promote the goals o f big business during their rules. Despite widespread optimism, 
these two democratically elected regimes did not even succeed in winning popular 
support in favor o f their fast-track reform programmes. This research also finds that 
economic reform programmes undertaken by both Mrs. Zia and Sheikh Hasina 
substantially increased the power of businessmen and industrialists and subsequently
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further reduced the state’s ability to develop an effective regulatory framework required 
to stop the abuse of public resources by business elites.
So, we can say that big business emerged as the dominant political force in Bangladesh, 
preventing the state from carrying out various redistribution programmes designed to 
reduce the sufferings o f those who are badly affected by the country’s transition to the 
market. Economic liberalization thus continued to frustrate the hopes o f its advocates 
and ordinary citizens o f Bangladesh.
Another crucial reason for the failure o f structural economic reform in Bangladesh is the 
corruption. According to public perception both petty and general corruption has 
increased in Bangladesh like many developed and developing countries. Experience of 
officials and members of business community corroborate the perception. The areas most 
prone to corrupt practices are public procurement, contracting including contracting out 
and consulting, public works, energy sector including exploration and generation, public 
services delivery including healthcare and education; utility and municipal services, 
regulatory bodies including telecommunication and financial services. These are 
corroborated by BPI of TI.
The causality between structural adjustment programme and increase or decrease in 
corruption cannot be established from the evidence/opinion/experience available. 
Structural Adjustment Programme if implemented in an appropriate environment, it is 
likely to increase consumer's surplus through reduction in transaction cost and increase in
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efficiency through heightened competition. But no such situation seems to have 
manifested itself in Bangladesh. Many causes suggest themselves including bureaucratic 
deviation, collusive restriction, unfair trade practices and so on. The logical conclusion 
seem to be more reforms and institutional capacity for good economic, political and 
social governance in a regime where civil society is vigilant and performs watchdog 
functions diligently. In Bangladesh the causes of secular increase in corruption is related 
to cronyism, connections, activities of family members and relatives, political donations, 
and bureaucratic deviation along with oversight o f fraud and extra legal activities. These 
are governance issues. The checks on such corruption are possible through strong 
political commitment, comprehensive and independent anti corruption commission, 
transparency of decision-making, enforcement o f accountability and civil society 
vigilance. These are again concern o f governance, which alone can make corruption a 
high-risk activity and institute reward and motivation for predictable rule-bound 
transparent and enforceable decision-making.
A r eview o f  the e mpirical d ata i n t his c hapter sh ows that aid  to  B angladesh has b een 
influenced by the political ambitions of the developed nations as well as local political 
groups. By comparing regimes with the break down of economic reforms, it is easy to 
spot the political considerations. As the experiment with socialism based economic and 
political system was replaced by the military leadership, the grants were replaced by 
loans as the developed nations felt Bangladesh was firmly in their camp. By the end of 
the 1980s, Bangladesh w as seen to be more firmly in the western block and suddenly 
more conditions were applied in order to qualify for aid. This involved structural changes
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including privatization, de-nationalization and democratic reforms. As Bangladesh 
moved into a democratic political structure in 1990s, developed countries connected their 
aid in the form of eonditional structural reforms or hard loans, not soft loans or grants as 
their attention become drawn to former nations of socialist block. In such a situation still 
the developing countries need aid to balance their annual budget deficits. In the next 
chapter I will discuss such structural adjustment reform policies pursued by Bangladesh 
and the effects o f such policies.
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Chapter Four
Foreign Aid and Structural Adjustment Programme
in Bangladesh
Introduction
“As Mao Tse-Tung warned his cadres as they took power in China in 1949, the 
‘sugar coated bullets of the bourgeoisie are likely to prove more fatal to a 
revolution than real bullets’” (Payer 1974).
Foreign aid is used as a lever to impose structural adjustment packages on the third 
world. Since the 1980s U.S. foreign assistance worldwide has been conditioned on the 
adoption o f structural adjustment packages designed by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. Making a grant or loan conditional on some action being 
taken by the recipient is called "conditionality." Conditionality works by "tranching" 
economic assistance packages-that is, dividing the total sum to be donated or loaned to a 
recipient country into a series o f smaller disbursements to be made over time, called 
tranches. For instance, before each disbursement is made, the recipient must make policy 
changes spelled out in the "covenants" of the aid agreement that they must sign with 
USAID.
Between 1982 and 1990, nine U.S. economic assistance packages provided to the Costa 
Rican government contained a total o f 357 "covenants" that made disbursement 
conditional on more than twenty structural changes in the domestic economy. These
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included eliminating a grain marketing board that assisted small farmers; slashing support 
prices for locally grown com, beans, and rice; allowing more imports from the United 
States; easing regulations on foreign investment and capital flows; and complying with 
specific clauses in similar agreements signed with the World Bank and the IMF. Such 
conditionality works in a ‘carrot-and-stick’ fashion. When the Costa Rican congress 
balked at approving an outrageous new law demanded by the United States that would 
allow aid to bypass the government and go directly to the private sector, USAID 
suspended a $23 million disbursement. Ironically, this came at the very moment at which 
the Costa Rican Central Bank had exhausted with the foreign exchange reserves needed 
for the daily operation of the economy. An internal USAID memo written several months 
before the incident occurred-which was obtained access to years later-showed just how 
cynical the United States can be. A top USAID administrator predicted the month in 
which the reserves would run dry and recommended timing a key disbursement to take 
advantage o f that moment as leverage to guarantee that the desired law would be passed.
It was precisely the replication o f changes like this and of structural adjustment- 
throughout the third world that produced rising inequalities. For instance, in Bangladesh, 
millions of the rural and urban poor are cut out from opportunities for progress. Credit, 
extension, subsidies, and technical education all fell by the wayside as budgets are 
slashed, and the lifting o f tariffs flooded local economies with imported foodstuffs often 
placed on the world market at prices below local costs of production. As a consequence, 
poor farmers were caught in a squeeze between the high price o f c hemicals and other 
farm inputs and low crop prices, often losing their lands and moving to cities.
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The structural adjustment programme is designed to eliminate distortions and elementary 
economics tells us distortions create allocative and distributive inefficiency. The 
programme was aimed to stimulate growth in developing economies most o f whom 
stagnated due to effects of external and internal shocks. The basic idea is simple i.e. 
establishing a market-determined regime; this requires containment o f the role o f the state 
in production and market. The state, which was earlier identified as the organized force 
for propelling growth, was identified as the prime source of distortion manifested through 
regulation, control, protection under high tariff wall, ownership and operation o f public 
enterprises, price control, exchange control, high presence in financial sector and poor 
quality o f public expenditure. The basic thrust of structural adjustment was deregulation, 
privatization, and liberalization for allowing the market forces to play their rightful role. 
The framers o f the policy possibly did not dream of achieving the ideal of a perfectly 
competitive economy in product, labor and capital markets, but generally couch their 
arguments in  the 1 anguage. Bangladesh implemented the structural adjustment policies 
since 1982 and enjoyed support o f Structural Adjustment Facility (SAP) and Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment facility (ESAF) in this regard. Bangladesh has been credited for 
carrying out one of the m ost rapid tariff liberalization and privatization programme as 
well as carrying out policy reforms in financial and fiscal sectors. It has devalued 
currency and decontrolled current account operations, it has adopted measures to 
deregulate many sectors including private investment and foreign direct investment, 
withdrawn many subsidies and price controls, reduced effective average tariff rates, 
followed on the whole a fiscal policy of budgetary deficit containment, rationalized tax
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structure, allowed monetary sector to function according to market signals and increased 
spending in social sector. It has not carried out labor market reform or a meaningful 
reform in public administration. The basic premise was that such policy adjustments and 
withdrawal o f state control will reduce costs due to transactions and inefficiency, increase 
entry into the market increasing competition, production and employment through a 
cumulative efficiency impact and these efficiency gains will increase productivity gain 
and income of factors thus propelling the economy towards higher gross domestic 
product.
International development economics gained prominence as a field o f academic and 
policy related endeavor following World War II. In July 1944, the IMF and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were created at the Mount 
Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, with the intent o f creating a new 
international economic order in the wake o f the Second World War. The 700 delegates at 
Bretton Woods envisioned a world where, guided by the Bretton Woods Institutions, 
improved living standards and peace would be sovereign. The establishment o f the 
Bretton Woods Institutions was predicated on the assumption that Southern economies, 
like their European counterparts, could absorb and effectively utilize large infusions of 
capital, despite the fact that the Third World lacked the level o f institutional 
infrastructure, the economic and social background, and the skilled personnel o f Europe. 
It was the contention o f prominent economists o f the time, as well as many of their 
successors, that large amounts o f foreign aid, private investment, and expanded trade 
opportunities would produce an economic "take-off and an export-led growth, the 
benefits of which would ultimately trickle down to even the poorest members o f each
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society. Under this theory, the new concept o f Structural Adjustment Policy reforms 
(SAP) were introduced basically since 1980s. Unfortunately, the failure o f this orthodox 
model of economic development to produce sustained economic well-being and growth 
for m ost Third W orld countries has come under fire. In the following sections I w ill 
discuss about the historical background of foreign aid and structural adjustment 
programmes and the consequences in Bangladesh.
Historical Background of Foreign Aid
To gain a better understanding of the consistently evolving relationship between foreign 
aid and structural adjustment policies, it is first necessary to understand when and why 
development became a focus of First World countries, and why and how foreign aid was 
introduced as a tool to foster the development process. The modem idea of foreign 
assistance began in the aftermath of World War II. The Bretton Woods system was 
implemented in 1944 when delegates tfom 40 countries met in New Hampshire to 
establish the World Bank, which emerged as the international organization set to provide 
financial resources to the war-torn economies of Europe (Bowen 4, 1998). The United 
States took individual action in 1948 when they created the European Recovery 
Programme, or the Marshall Plan, which committed $13 billion to recovery from World 
War II (Hoy 1998, 16) and was the largest reconstmction programme of the time 
(Hellinger, Hellinger and O ’Regan 1988, 15). 89% of the funds went to European 
countries, and as a result the recipients saw accelerated e conomic g rowth by the early 
1950's (Bowen 5, 1998). The Marshall Plan set the stage for early foreign assistance 
programmes in developing countries, and was succeeded by the Mutual Security Act of
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1951. This legislation was passed to “utilize large sums of money to build up quickly 
economic structures and political allegiances deemed necessary to fight communism” 
(Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan 1988, 15). The Mutual Security Agency’s goal was to 
unite military, economic and technical assistance programmes in the United States’ 
foreign policy. President Truman, in 1950, reminded the First World o f the moral 
implications o f foreign aid to abolish humanity’s “ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and 
despair” (Hoy 1998, 17). This call o f moral duty was not lasting due to the explosion of 
the Cold War. Funds were allocated towards infrastructure reconstructing programmes 
primarily focused on defense building, and secondarily towards economic development 
projects designed to increase the flow of capital to the country. The focus for the United 
States during the fifties was specifically India, Pakistan, and other countries in the Near 
East, with aid figures totaling nearly $300 million (Hellinger, Hellinger, and O ’Regan. 
1988, 15). President Kennedy reiterated the moralistic obligation o f the First World to 
combat poverty in the rest of world in 1961, but focused on the connection between US 
security and foreign aid (Hoy 1998, 17). The US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) w as established in  1 961—the start o f  the “ First Development Decade”— and 
was designed to “promote the foreign, security and general welfare o f the US by assisting 
peoples o f the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and 
external security” (Hoy 1998, 18). It was created in response to unsuccessful US foreign 
aid policies attempting to foster long-term development country. USAID is the ultimate 
form of bilateral assistance, or foreign aid given by a nation’s government to the 
government of an undeveloped. The Cold War had a strong influence on the direction of 
US foreign aid towards the promotion of democracy and stability in countries unaffiliated
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with the US or the USSR (Hoy 1998, 21). The Second Decade of Development, the 
1970’s, promoted ‘basics human needs’ in response to the famines in Africa and the oil 
crisis of the Middle East (Bowen 1998, 7), as well as to combat the negative view of 
foreign aid among US citizens. The United States turned its efforts to the Caribbean and 
Latin America, where the focus shifted from industrialization and savings rate to rural 
development and employment (Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan. 1988, 21). A 
réévaluation of the effectiveness o f foreign assistance lead to the “New Direction” 
legislation incorporated in the Foreign Assistance Act o f the mid-1970’s (Hellinger, et al. 
1988, 22). The goal o f this revamped foreign aid policy was to ensure the flow of foreign 
assistance directly to the poorest o f countries to stimulate development (Hoy 1998, 22). 
“Food for development” replaced the notion o f Food Aid and stipulated that nations 
receiving food w ere not expected to repay the loans given to purchase the supplies as 
long as the went towards the establishment of development programmes in agriculture, 
nutrition, health services and population planning (Hoy 1 998, 24). This project failed, 
however, due to the inability o f the recipient countries to properly establish the 
infrastructure of these development programmes. The liberal aid policies o f the 70’s were 
redirected when conservatives seized control of the White House in the 1980’s 
(Hellinger, Hellinger and O’Regan. 26). President Reagan redirected foreign aid’s focus 
from the humanitarian to militaristic, and sustainable development became the goal o f US 
foreign aid in the United States (Hoy 1998, 22). For the US, in the 1980’s, a majority o f 
the foreign aid given was in the form of militaristic aid through the formation of the 
Military Assistance Programme (Hoy 1998, 21). In 1989, Japan replaced the US as the 
lead donor o f “absolute amount of funds transferred” (Hoy 1998, 31). With the fall of
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communism, hopes soared among the Third World nations that the goal o f foreign aid 
would shift from a political to a developmental focus. However, previously communist 
nations were added to the list o f recipients, and Third World countries received less aid 
than previously allocated (Hoy 1998, 27). Industrialization and technological discoveries 
fueled the North towards unheard of levels o f economic growth, only further widening 
the already expansive development gap between the North and the South. So, in such a 
situation, theoretically, structural adjustment programme was dictated by the IMF and 
World Bank to stabilize the economic situation in third world countries since 1980s. 
Unfortunately, such reforms are not helping to sustain development in the long run. 
Rather, it is creating the vested elite and powerful groups locally and externally and 
leaving the vast majority o f the society in poverty and sufferings.
The Relationship Between Foreign Aid and the SAP
Historically, the relationship between foreign aid and structural adjustment dates back to 
the cold war period when foreign aid was used for the purpose of political structural 
reforms as well as geo-strategic reforms. On the passage o f time since 1980s the trend of 
the SAP has been changed and introduced for economic reforms under the auspices o f the 
IMF and the World Bank for economic stability in the third world countries. Under the 
condition o f adopting the SAP, foreign aid is approved by the IMF and the World Bank 
in most of the recipient countries. Unfortunately the SAP did not help reduce poverty. It 
rather created huge unemployment when the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were 
denationalized leaving the workers jobless. So, foreign aid is used as a lever to impose 
structural adjustment policies on the third world countries to accumulate resources by the
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handful private sectors; rather than help vas marginalized rural poor in the country like 
Bangladesh. So, in that sense, the connections between aid and the SAP are interlinked. 
As a result, I realize that it is important to bring the issue o f the SAP in this study.
The Evolution of Structural Adjustment Policies
The term ‘structural adjustment policies’ (SAPs) can be given a number o f meanings, but 
it is usually taken to characterize the kind of policies recommended to heavily indebted 
countries or who have balance of payments deficits. The aim is to make them credit­
worthy again and to lay the foundations for subsequent sustainable growth. The impetus 
for SAPs comes from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose 
rationale w as that S APs would premote high quality growth, which would 1 ead to  the 
enhancement o f living standards and the quality of life for everyone. According to IMF 
and World Bank proponents the key elements of adjustment are reform and restructuring 
based on new macro-economic policies such as a firm anti-inflationary monetary policy, 
a sustainable fiscal strategy and a realistic exchange rate, a market-friendly environment 
for growth, a liberal trade and exchange regime that fosters international trade and 
investment, active social policies (including well- targeted social safety net provisions), 
and good governance.
However, in all fairness, it must be acknowledged that the IMF/World Bank structures 
for reform did not illustrate a uniform strategy. During their life, SAPs, were very much 
influenced by restructuring within the World Bank and IMF, reflecting the shift in 
policies most dramatically over the 1980s and 1990s. These shifts were in response both
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to external criticism of SAP as well as to internal ideological debates between the 
proponents o f sustainable development policies on the one hand and the hardcore 
economic reformists on the other. Ultimately however, the real shift came from the 
failure o f economies which had already embraced SAPs, particularly the South-east 
Asian nations whose economic collapse in the mid 1990s showed the world that 
IMF/World Bank strategies were not effective. The following illustrates the 
transformation in SAP strategies since Bretton Woods (post World War II) indicating the 
tenuous nature o f the policies and their rationale:
1. 1950s and 1960s: IMF provided financial assistance to mainly industrial countries. 
Policy advice was focused on macroeconomic policies to aid post-war reconstruction.
2. 1970s and 1980s: financial assistance was provided to developing countries and 
countries in transition. The focus shifted to the complementarities o f macro-economic 
policies and structural reforms. Formulation o f medium term policies.
3. Late 1990s: Third generation SAPs such as trade and exchange rate liberalization, 
reduction of the budget deficit, removal of subsidies from petroleum products and 
other basic commodities, privatization of state-owned enterprises and reduction of 
staff in the public service evolved.
Simultaneously however, issues of poverty and income distribution in relation to 
structural adjustment programme, including safety nets to protect the most vulnerable 
sections o f the population became part of the SAP rhetoric. There was also the 
development o f the concept of consultation with governments as a precursor to the 
pressure to apply SAPs since experience had shown that SAPs were unsuccessful unless
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based on social consensus. Finally, governments were requested to move funds away 
from the military to social welfare and poverty alleviation schemes. In fact, social welfare 
spending w as considered to  be  criteria for further 1 ending. G ender equity programmes 
and human rights were similarly promoted.
The evidences show that the relationship between aid and structural adjustment policies 
are vital and structural adjustment policies are important to implement the aim and goal 
o f foreign aid. In another words, to make foreign aid workable structural adjustment 
policies have been introduced. Now a days foreign aid is given on the basis o f structural 
adjustment policies. But the critics of the IMF/World Bank SAP policies have provided 
an alternative view. They have argued that SAPs were intended to extract as much debt 
repayment as possible so as to avoid the equitable sharing of loan losses between 
creditors and borrowers and to make those economies conform to a single economic 
model compatible with the long term interests o f a world economy dominated by rich 
industrialized countries. There was criticism also o f the impact o f SAPs on the 
environment and natural resources o f the indebted countries and on commodity prices as 
all nations competed to expand and restructure simultaneously in a shrinking 
international market. And, finally, there were accusations that SAP strategies for recovery 
failed to take account o f the specific conditions o f countries, o f the problems related to 
competitive currency devaluation resulting from the requirement to liberalise foreign 
currency, o f the reduction in the availability of resources for the realization o f economic, 
social and cultural rights, of the weakening role of the State, and o f the social 
consequences o f reducing state expenditure.
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I. The SAP
The Structural Adjustment Programme in Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the experience of policy reforms as part of aid conditionalities is not new. 
During the period 1972-1986, the Government of Bangladesh contracted 13 Import 
Programme Credits (IPC) amounting to a total o f $1165 million. According to the World 
Bank (1986), the first three IPCs supported critical post-independence rehabilitation 
needs. All other credits had conditionalities addressing sectoral, microeconomic and 
institutional reforms.
According to the WB's review o f the experience with policy reforms in the 1980s, the 
policy issues identified in the IPCs 'turned out to require a more extended dialogue and 
in-depth sector work than the annual IPC framework allowed.' Thus, the Bank shifted its 
course from annual programme loans to sector adjustment loans and IPCs were phased 
out after the 13th IPC.
The government in 1986-87 adopted a medium-term adjustment programme administered 
under a three-year arrangement o f the Fund's Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and 
by various sector adjustment and investment credits from the WB. Bangladesh was one o f 
the first 35 countries contracted to SAF, set up b y  the IMF in march 1986 to provide 
higly concessional but extremely conditional loans in support of structural adjustment in 
low-income economies. The policies o f the government for the three-year period were
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given in the Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) prepared by the Fund and the Bank (with 
negligible input from the national agencies). Negotiations took place in August 1989, 
February 1990, and May 1990 on a further three-year programme under the Fund's 
Enhanced S tructural Adjustment F acility ( ESAF) a n d th a t became effective on  July 1, 
1990. Here, again, Bangladesh was among the first 29 countries having recourse to the 
ESAF, initiated by the Fund in December 1987.
Bangladesh first signed a loan from the IMF under the Extended Fund Facility in 
December 1980. The loan agreement was, however, revoked in July 1980, barely six 
months after its initiation due to the inability on her part to adhere to the limits imposed 
on government borrowing (Matin, 1986). Only SDR (special drawing rights)20 million 
out o f a total commitment o f SDR. 800 million was disbursed at the time o f suspension. 
However, the following sections are an overview and consequences o f structural 
adjustment programme.
The Design o f  Structural Adjustment Programme
The macroeconomic objectives o f the adjustment programme during the SAF period were 
to raise the annual real GDP growth to 5 percen t, moderate the rate o f inflation, and 
contain the central government budget and external current account deficits at 7 per cent 
o f GDP. The structural policies were aimed at improving the efficiency o f  resource use, 
enhancing the role o f the private sector, and realizing higher rates o f domestic savings 
and investment. The proposed reforms include changes in price incentives; simplification 
o f investment regulations; strengthening of tax policy and administration; improvements
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in financial management of public enterprises; greater reliance on market oriented 
monetary policy instruments; intensification o f recovery programmes o f non-performing 
bank loans; flexible exchange rate management; and trade and exchange liberalization.
The objectives under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
• Agricultural sector reform, including a greater role for the private sector in the 
distribution of inputs and the rationalization o f the operations o f the Public Food -grain 
Distribution System (PFDS) and the jute sector.
• Improved industrial incentives, including the easing of private investment procedures
• Comprehensive tax reform to improve the elasticity, efficiency and progressivity o f the
tax system and raise revenue in relation to GDP.
• Reorientation of public expenditure to support growth and poverty alleviation
• Strengthening of public enterprise finances through more flexible pricing policies, a 
vigorous effort to ensure that payment is received for goods and services, and 
measures to improve cost control and performance evaluation.
• Financial sector reform aimed at improving the effficiency of intermediation through
adoption o f more market-oriented methods of monetary management.
• R eform o f t  rade p olicies to  s trengthen e xport growth a n d d  iversification, r emoval o f
export subsidies, import liberalisation and further rationalisation of the tariff structure.
• Exchange rate policy that ensures competitiveness and contributes to a macroeconomic
framework conducive to higher savings and investment, price stability, and external 
adjustment.
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Policies Under Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF)
The IMF in its PFPs under ESAF programme lists a host o f priority measures. This, 
according to the IMF, would reduce obstacles to private sector initiatives, improve public 
resource management, rationalise the public enterprises, strengthen the effectiveness o f 
the financial system, and liberalise the exchange and trade regime. Adheren to these, as 
expounded in IMF's PFPs, would lead the country to achieve higher economic growth, 
with emphasis on poverty alleviation through human resource development and increased 
resource mobilisation.
The priority structural and macroeconomic policies prescribed by the IMF under ESAF 
are given below:
Table 4.1 : Priority Measures under the ESAF
I. Agricultural Policy
• Maintain liberalisation of import and distribution of irrigation equipment and 
fertiliser
• Reduce subsidies on agricultural inputs
• Maintain adequate producer price incentives
II. Industrial and Trade Policy
• Further simplify investment regulations
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• Eliminate quantitative restrictions on imports except for those required for reasons 
o f religion, health,
• Security and social considerations and a small number o f highly sensitive items
• Rationalise the tariff structure and reduce maximum tariff levels
• Remove export subsidies
III. Public Resource Mobilisation
• Expand the base of the value-added tax
• Reform personal and company direct taxes
• Strengthen the tax administration
• Adjust prices for public goods and services while improving their operational 
efficiency
IV. Public Expenditure Policies
• Implement a three-year prioritised public investment programme
• Limit the growth o f current expenditures to less than the growth o f nominal GDP
• Reduce subsidies and administrative costs
• Improve project aid utilisation
• Reduce the operating deficit o f Bangladesh railway
V. Public Enterprises
• Reduce excess labour
• Enforce payment o f debt-service liabilities and eliminate inter-agency arrears
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• Rationalise the jute mills
• Improve the operational performance and financial management o f Bangladesh 
Power Development Board and other public entities
VI. Privatisation
• Privatise selected public manufacturing/ commercial enterprises already approved 
by government and expedite the identification of additional enterprises for 
privatization
• Announce a timetable for implementation
VII. Financial Sector Reform
• Implement reforms aimed at a market-oriented system of monetary management
• Undertake further interest rate liberalisation
• Strengthen commercial hank loan recovery programmes
VIII. External Sector Policy
• Manage the exchange rate to ensure competitiveness
• Export diversification
• Efficient import substitution
IX. Human Resources and Poverty Alleviation
• Improve the access of women to education and income generating activities
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Provide adequate funding for primary education, health and family planning 
services
Target food aid to poverty groups and reduce cash subsidies to monetised food 
distribution
X. Environment
The government will articulate a clear policy on environmental issues and prepare 
environmental assessments for major new projects.’^
World Bank Adjustment Lending
The adjustment programme was supported by two three-year arrangements under the 
SAF and ESAF o f the IMF and by various sector adjustment and investment credits from 
the International Development Association (IDA), soft-term lending window of the WB. 
These highly concessional but extremely conditional loans go under the generic names o f 
"structural and sectoral adjustment loans" (SALs and SECALs)). This new generation of 
"policy-based loans" was devised to help countries to adjust. These WB loan agreements 
included tight conditionalities, under which money was disbursed only if  the government 
complied with structural adjustment reforms and met the deadline for implementation 
with precision. According to the WB's Country Assistance Review (CAR), adjustment
17 Compiled from: a. International Monetary Fund, Bangladesh: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, 
Policy Framework Paper, 1990. b. International Monetary fund, “Bangladesh: Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility, Policy Framework Paper, 1991/92 - 1993/94,” August 9, 1991. c. International 
Monetary Fund, “Bangladesh: Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, Policy Framework Paper, 1992/93 
- 1994/95” August 20, 1992.
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lending constituted a third o f total commitments of IDA to Bangladesh during the period 
under CAR's review (FY1980 to FY1996). IDA commitments to Bangladesh during that 
period amounted to $5,965 billion, involving 93 projects. Disbursement during the said 
period totalled $4.65 billion. The scale o f adjustment lending declined in the 1990s to 
about 15 per cent. The WB explicitly stated that the adjustment lending would decline in 
future. The CAR categorically states that the adjustment lending will undoubtedly decline 
further in the absence o f key reform initiatives in certain sectors (e.g. finance).
Table 2 shows the commitments o f IDA loans to Bangladesh by sectors and the amounts 
of adjustment credit.
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Table 4.2: Share of Adjustment Loans in IDA's Commitment to Bangladesh 18
In million US dollars In per cent of total
Sector Loans Adjustment Loans Adjustment
Agriculture 1186.6 20 —
Education 411.6 7 —




Multi-sector 1237.0 1141.0 21 19




T elecommunications 35.0 — 1 —
Transportation 815.7 — 14 —
Urban Development 47.6 — 1 —
Water supply and 
sanitation
50.0 1
Other 173.0 — 3 —
Total 5965.4 1756.7 100 30
Source,- Adapted from Bhattacharya (2001)
' Financial Database of the World Bank, quoted in Country Assistance Review, 1998
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Table 4.3 provides summary statistics about the SALs and SECALs that Bangladesh 
contracted.
Out of six SALs and SECALs, three (i.e. Second Industrial Adjustment Credit, Jute 
Sector Adjustment Credit, Public Revenue Management Adjustment Credit) were 
cancelled because o f the government's failure to adhere to the policy conditionalities 
attached to these credits.
Energy Sector Adjustment Credit:
The credit o f an amount o f SDR. 137.0 million was approved by the Bank on April 11, 
1989 and was supplemented by an amount of SDR. 1.8 million by GOB. The credit was 
fully disbursed and closed on July 3, 1990.
Industrial Sector Adjustment Credit:
The Bank approved the SDR. 147.8 million (equivalent to US 190 million dollars) credit 
on June 6, 1987. The credit was fully disbursed and closed on May 11, 1989, seven 
months ahead of the original schedule.
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Financial Sector Adjustment Credit:
On June 5, 1990, the WB approved the credit amount o f SDR. 132.7 million (equivalent 
to 132.7 million) and made it effective on June 22, 1990. Two supplementary credits, 
amounting to a total o f SDR. 5.4 million were signed on January 16, 1991 and January 
15, 1992 respectively.
The first tranche of the credit was released by February 1992 and the second tranche was 
disbursed on August 26, 1992, after a delay of eighteen months from the targeted date 
and the third and final tranche was released on December 30, 1993, after a delay o f 20 
months. The credit was closed on February 22, 1994, much later than the original closing 
date of September 30, 1992.
Second Industrial Sector Adjustment Credit:
The credit to the tune of SDR. 72.2 million (US $100 million) was approved by the 
Bank's Board on October 27, 1992 and was made effective on November 5, 1993, though 
the scheduled date was January 1993.The credit was cancelled after disbursing the first 
tranche, leaving a balance of US $ 50 million.
Jute Sector Adjustment Credit:
The largest ever credit to the country was approved on February 17, 1994 and made 
effective on April 5, 1994. O f the SDR. 175 million, only the first tranche, amounting to
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SDR. 35 million was released. The eredit was closed on dune 30, 1997, leaving the three 
other tranches —the second, the third and the floating—cancelled.
Public Resource Management Adjustment Credit
This credit o f SDR 109.3 million was approved on May 5, 1992 and made effective on 
dune 8, 1992. Out o f three tranches, two were disbursed while the third tranche 
amounting to SDR 36.9 million was cancelled.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics of SALs and SECALs in Bangladesh 19




9457 Industrial Sector Credit






18160 9457 Industrial Sector Credit 2.5 2.4 3#9 3/90
19990 9511 Energy Sector Credit 175.0 177.1 4/89 12/91
19991 9511 Energy Sector Credit 2.3 2.3 10/89 12/91
20000 9521 Export Development 25.0 27.1 4/89 6/94
21520 9528 Financial sector Credit 175.0 184.4 6/90 12/93
21521 9528 Financial sector Credit 3.5 3.4 11/90 9/92
21522 9528 Financial sector Credit 2.9 3.0 11/91 01/93
23610 9464 Public Resource mgmt Credit 150.0 100.6 5/92 12/96
24270 9513 Industrial sector Adjust. Loan II 100.0 50.1 10/92 12/94
24271 9513 Industrial sector Adjust. Loan III 3.5 3.5 12/92 01/94
25670 9553 Jute Sector Adjustment Credit 247.0 52.0 02/94 6/97
25671 9553 Jute Sector Adjustment Credit 3.4 3.6 5/94 6/95
25672 9553 Jute Sector Adjustment Credit 3.2 0.0 12/94 09/96
25670 9553 Jute Sector Adjustment Credit 0.0 0.0 12/96
Source: Adapted from  Bhattacharya (2001)
19 World Bank Bangladesh Country Office.
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IL The Assessments of the SAP in Bangladesh
The IMF Evaluation 
Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF)
The IMF in its Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Policy Framework Paper, 
1990/91- 1992/93 records the performance of the economy during the SAF period that 
the government contracted with the Fund in 1986/87 for a period o f three years. The IMF 
stated that the macroeconomic objectives were not 'fully realized’. The real GDP growth 
averaged only 3 per cent annually as against the target growth rate of 5 per cent per 
annum. The slow growth was partly attributed b y  the IMF to the disruption caused to 
economic activities by successive natural calamities in 1987/88 and 1988/89. The 
agricultural output stagnated. The lower jute production and flood damage to rice crops 
was shown as reasons for the stagnation o f output growth. According to the Fund, the 
manufacturing production grew slowly because o f weak domestic demand. Domestic and 
national savings increased in the initial year o f the programme, but declined in relation to 
GDP in the two subsequent years. Budget revenue fell much short o f expectations. The 
Fund attributed it to the government's failure to introduce reforms on the scale originally 
envisioned by the Fund. Revenue showed no improvement. The objectives o f containing 
inflation and balance o f payments pressures were broadly achieved.
Extended Structural Adjustment Facilities (ESAF)
The macroeconomic objectives of the first-year programme, supported under ESAF, were 
to raise real GDP growth to 4.6 per cent; reduce the inflation rate to 7.5 per cent; contain
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the budget deficit to 6.5 per cent of GDP; and hold the external current account deficit to 
6.5 per cent of GDP. According to the IMF, the growth, inflation and investment 
outcomes for 1990-91 were low mainly because o f the impact o f the Gulf crisis and the 
cyclone. It attributed the 3.2 per cent realised growth to the decreased activity in the 
non-agricultural sector and the modest increase in agricultural production over the 
bumper harvest o f 1989/90. The inflation of 8.9 per cent was explained by the IMF with 
the higher oil import costs and increase in the administered prices o f public goods and 
services. According to the IMF, the shortfall in revenue was due to 
lower-than-programmed dutiable imports as a result o f the cyclone and difficulties in 
collecting excise duties from the natural gas and cigarette companies.
Consistent with the three-year ESAF-supported programme, the macroeconomic 
objectives o f the second year programme were to raise real GDP growth to 4.7 per cent; 
reduce inflation rate to 6.5 per cent; contain the budget deficit to about 7 per cent of 
GDP; and hold the external current account deficit to 6.5 per cent o f GDP. The IMF 
attributed the growth rate of 3.2 per cent in the second year to the sluggish domestic 
demand and production owing to delays in implementing the public investment 
programme, their adverse impact on private investment and the uncertainty associated 
with the external shock due to the Gulf crisis.
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The World Bank Evaluation
The WB's Operation Evaluation Department (OED) carried out a Country Assistance 
Review (CARj for FY1980 to FY 1996 to evaluate the relevance and efficacy o f the 
Bank's assistance in Bangladesh. The review covering 16 years and 93 projects is based 
on a massive volume o f economic and sector work (ESW) and policy dialogues 
encompassing every aspect of the economic and social life of Bangladesh.
The CAR's main conclusion is that: "IDA's assistance to Bangladesh over the past fifteen 
years has been effective, and the partnership forged with the government has brought 
about notable successes." The CAR notes the "good progress" achieved in  the general 
well-being o f the population, notwithstanding the "not spectacular" trend of growth rate 
o f Gross Domestic Revenue (GDR). It goes on to record the strides made in the reduction 
o f fertility and "good progress" made in education, particularly primary education with 
'strong attendance o f the girls’. It asserts that the country has "achieved' serf-sufficiency 
in food-grains in a normal climate year as a result of liberalisation in agricultural input 
trade and smallholders' productivity. Nevertheless, the WB expresses its scepticism about 
the sustainability o f the achievements already made. The CAR adds: "questions remain as 
to food security, the country's aid dependency and the fragility o f the eco-system."
Country Assistance Strategy (1980-1996)
The World Bank has been involved in Bangladesh's economic development since its 
Independence in 1971. The WB's current all-encompassing role that has evolved through
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in policy advice, lending and donor coordination, according to the Bank, was "coloured 
by a fundamental difference regarding the country's post-independence policy framework 
and the role o f market systems" till 1973/74. Since then, the Bank and government have 
forged an 'active development partnership.' Over the past two decades, IDA has financed 
about a quarter o f all foreign aid commitments to Bangladesh, covering all sectors o f the 
economy, including import and balance o f payments support. Table 4 shows how the 
focuses o f IDA country assistance strategies have evolved over the years. While political 
economy and governance issues were less appreciated during the first half o f the 1980s, 
the sensitivity to these issues now tops the list. The Review gives "fully satisfactory" 
ratings to the Bank's strategies o f 1991-96 for reflecting past experience, realism of 
outcome projections and risk assessment and an adequacy of monitorable progress 
indicators
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Table 4.4: Relevance of IDA's Country Assistance Strategy20
Issue 1980-85 1986-90 1991-96
























Does strategy reflect 
past experience
2 2 2
Realism o f outcome 
projections
I 1 3







Average score 1.6 1.8 3.1
Source: Adapted from  the World Bank (1998)
Implementation Status
Project implementation in Bangladesh has been a persistent problem, which, according to 
the CAR, has been effecting negatively the implementation o f IDA's development 
assistance strategy. The salient features identified by the CAR are given below:
Bangladesh: Country Assistance Review, World Bank, Report No. 17455-BD, March 6, 1998. 
Note: Rating system: 4 = Highly satisfactoy, 3 = Fully satisfactory, 2 = marginally satisfactory, 1 
deficient
134
The disbursement ratio is still below the Bank-wide average o f 18.8 per cent, although 
the disbursement ratio for Bangladesh rose to 17.3 per cent in FY 1996 from the 
average o f about 11 per cent throughout the 1980s.
In FY 1980, 12.5 per cent of the ongoing portfolio o f the Bank was given a "problem 
rating', which climbed to a peak o f 29.5 per cent in FY 1986 to stay for the rest o f the 
1980s. The proportion of problem projects has gradually declined during the 1990s to 
21.4 per cent in FY 1996, which is still above Bank-wide averages.
Of the 63 projects evaluated during 1980-96 by the QED, 24 projects or 38 per cent 
were rated as "unsatisfactory," compared to a Bank-wide OED rating o f 33 per cent. 
Thirty-five percent o f Bangladesh's projects was rated 'sustainable'. Regarding the 
institutional development performance, 36 per cent o f rated Bangladesh projects had a 
negligible institutional development rating compared to 24 per cent Bank-wide. Out o f 
13 operations in terms of sectors in Bangladesh, only 3 or 23 per cent had a satisfactory 
rating.
The primary measure used by the Bank for estimating the efficiency of IDA-assisted 
programme is staff years (SYs) spent per approved project. In lending SYs spent per 
project is almost 40 per cent higher than the Bank-wide average. Bangladesh lending 
completion SYs were over twice the South Asia average, and 4.3 times the Bank-wide
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average. Bangladesh requires over 50 per cent more calendar time to take a project 
from the project concept stage to the Board approval stage.
• With regard to the time taken between the Board approval and effectiveness o f the 
Credit, o f 83 projects reviewed by QED, 53 or over 70 per cent took longer than three 
months, 45 or 54 per cent took six months or longer, and an astounding number o f 24 
projects or 29 per cent took nine months to be declared effective.
The CAR attributed the dismal performance of the WB's projects in Bangladesh to 
administrative logjams in the country, lack o f "full commitment" to projects, and 
deficient project preparation and design. The report thus suggested keeping effectiveness 
conditions to a bare minimum, but advised "most of the required actions" to be completed 
before the approval o f a credit by the WB's Board. Though there is likelihood that this 
may lengthen the time between negotiations and board presentation, according to the 
CAR, this would create a greater sense of urgency to complete the required actions.
III. Development Outcomes
M acroeconomic Performance
The WB views the growth performance o f Bangladesh as "not spectacular" and its own 
estimation reveals the rate ranging between 3.5 to 4.5 per cent per annum. Investment, 
both private and public, has been inadequate when compared with the countries of South 
Asia or with those having similar per capita incomes.
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• There has been a remarkable decline in the relative share o f agriculture in GDP from 
over 40 per cent in the early 1980s to 25 per cent by the late 1990s.
• The gross domestic savings as percentage of G DP have taken an upturn from 1.3 in 
1981-1985 to 7.7 per cent in 1991-1995. According to the WB, it was recorded because 
o f "strong" growth in private savings owing to increased monetisation o f the economy, 
coupled with a wide expansion of banking service to rural areas. The sharp rise of 
workers) remittance from abroad in the latter part of the 1980s and in the 1990s added 
to the pool of private savings. The public sector improved its savings performance 
entirely due to better tax collection and introduction of the value added tax system.
• Throughout much of the 1980s, reserves were at a precarious level, given the country's 
susceptibility to the natural shocks and very high current account deficit averaging over 
9.0 per cent o f GDP. Since 1989 the WB, however, finds a sustained improvement in 
the country's macroeconomic management, as well as a sustained period of structural 
adjustment and liberalisation.
• Export values in GDP in 1995 were equivalent to over 17 per cent o f GDP, rising from 
just 8 per cent o f GDP in 1988, mostly contributed by ready-made garments (RMG) 
and other non-traditional products. The RMG grew from almost zero in 1982 to over 
US$ 2 billion by 1995. Since 1990, the overall budget deficit showed an improved 
trend rate, mainly due to progress in revenue collection, together with a lessened net 
loss of public enterprises.
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Table 4.5: Fiscal Performance as Percentage of GDP,21
Indicators 1986 - 90 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Overall Budget 
Deficit -7.4 -7.2 -5.9 -5.9 -6.0 -6.8
Revenue 8.8 9.6 10.9 12.0 12.2 12.1
Expenditure 16.3 16.8 16.8 17.8 18.1 18.9
Current 7.9 8.7 8.3 8.9 8.9
Annual Development 
Programme 7.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 8.4 8.8
Gross Losses of 
Public Enterprises 1.1
2.1 1.9 1.1 0.8
NA
Net Losses o f Public 
Enterprises 0.8 1.8 1.6 0.7 0.6
NA
Foreign Financing 7.0 6.2 4.9 5.6 4.9
Source;
Industry and Finance
Real growth in manufacturing averaged only 2.6 per cent per annum between 1981 and 
1990, below the GDP growth of 3.2 per cent per annum. The disappointing trend 
continued.
According to the Bank, new private investment was stagnant through much o f the period 
and the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) continued to perform poorly. With regard to the 
poor performance of the manufacturing sector, the WB identified some policy 
constraints, interfering with the growth o f the private manufacturing sectors. These are 
furnished below:
• A high cost o f capital and access to credit has been a major difficulty for small 
manufacturing enterprises.
Bangladesh: Country Assistance Review, World Bank, Report No. 17455-BD, March 6, 1998
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• The Government's policy of supporting "sick" private and public industrial enterprises 
has weakened the banking system, and this lack of "exit" for insolvent firms has 
weakened stronger competitors.
• Despite some trade policy reform, the manufacturing sector throughout the 1980s was 
highly protected and oriented toward the domestic market which can now grow only as 
fast as the disposable income.
• Despite some denationalisation, the high degree o f continuing public sector ownership 
in several large manufacturing sub-sectors such as textiles and jute has inhibited 
investment and technological progress.
Agriculture
According to the WB's estimate, agriculture growth rate between 1980 and 1996 
averaged 2.1 per cent per annum or about the same pace of population growth. To the 
WB, the growth rate is, however, "curious" as against the large increase in fertiliser use, 
introduction of high yielding varieties and widespread irrigation.
Social Sector^^
The WB finds good progress made in the social sector, although, according to the CAR, 
the GDP growth performance during the 1980s and 1990s has not been spectacular.
^ Bangladesh: Country Assistance Review, World Bank, Report No. 17455-BD, March 6, 1998
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Fertility has declined to about 2.4 and infant mortality has declined to 77 per 1000 live 
births in FY 1994 compared to those of 3.2 and 111.5 in FY 1981.
After the stagnant primary school enrolment for almost thirty years, gross enrolment 
rose from 55 per cent in 1985 to 63 per cent in 1990.
Country Assistance Review
The IDA feels that its assistance to Bangladesh has been effective and has brought about 
some notable success. It prides itself on assisting the country's "transformation" against 
the backdrop of a "very difficult political climate." If attributes the hindrances to progress 
to "deeply entrenched governance issues and powerful vested interests that have sought 
to maintain the status quo."
The CAR poses two important questions relating to each sector and answers to these 
questions would avowedly determine the IDA strategy, the type o f lending and ESW:
(a) What should and can the government do and what should be done by the private 
sector and NGOs? and,
(b) How can the services provided by the public sector be made more responsive to the 
needs of the stakeholders?
Independent Reviews
The structural adjustment process in Bangladesh has received criticism from local 
academics both for its underlying ideology and its social, political and economic costs.
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The disagreements focus on the choice, pacing and sequencing of its instruments. Despite 
their particular focus, studies to date have mainly deployed 'target versus actual, 'before 
versus after' and 'with and without programme' approaches to finding out the impact of 
the adjustment policies. The analytical basis for these approaches, however weak as a 
scientific model which causally links the specific policy intervention prescribed under 
adjustment with micro-macro changes, is yet to be designed (Sobhan,1993)
The UNDP in its report on human development in 1993 made several points o f criticism. 
Rahman (1992) concentrated on the macroeconomic performance o f Bangladesh during 
the 1980s. Mujeri et al (1993) set to finding out the impact structural adjustment left on 
poverty, employment and distribution. Sobhan (1993) argued for a renewed reform 
agenda by reappraising the logic and causality o f the ongoing reform agenda. These 
studies, covering mostly the period up to 1989 or 1990/91, were unable to assess the 
'final' results of the 'full' period of stabilisation due to the obvious reason o f data 
availability. The available studies, despite their varied objectives and focuses, have 
analytical shortcomings as they assumed a causal relationship without investigating 
whether the relationship held good.
For an indicative assessment, however, one may look at the intertemporal sectoral 
studies, as adjustment policies have in effect interfaced with every aspect o f the 
economy.
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The UNDP on Aid
The UNDP in its periodic review of Bangladesh's human development in 1993 devoted a 
section to 'Structural Adjustment and Human Development in Bangladesh' articulated 
major controversies in this respect. The following is a list o f issues which summarises the 
concerns expressed by the UNDP (1993):
• SAP should go beyond the text-book approach to take into account the contextual 
reality for the purpose of pragmatic implementation of a programme sustaining higher 
levels of growth and output. The pre-occupation with macro-balances is argued to be 
detrimental to medium-trend growth rate prospects and long-run transformation o f the 
economy. It is added that a less contractionary macroeconomic policy would be 
preferable, given the low levels o f output and investment.
• Excessive emphasis given in the SAP design on demand management policies dwarfs 
issues of human development such as employment generation, poverty alleviation, 
illiteracy eradication, etc. The design should have incorporated some macro policies 
which could strengthen the expansionary approach to serving the poor.
• In contrast to the Bank/Fund's 'hands o ff policy, the state should continue to invest in 
economic sectors as they suffer from the disappointing outcome of privatisation.
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• Across-the-board liberalisation is certainly no panacea. It might thwart the growth of 
the nascent indigenous economic activities by exposing these enterprises to sudden 
competition.
• There is hardly any reliable information in favour o f 'crowding' rather than crowding 
out of private investment in absence o f public investment in Bangladesh.
M acroeconomic Performance
The growth rate o f GDP virtually remained stagnant over the last years. If  one traces the 
growth path o f Bangladesh, the 'era o f adjustment' will appear to have a lower growth 
rate than the growth rates prevailing in the early 1980s (Sobhan, 1996). Table 6 shows 
that growth has remained arrested at around 4 per cent per annum.




1990/91 - 1993/94 4T8%
Source: Adapted from the World Bank (1997)
Agriculture
" World Bank, March 16,1995, Recent Economic Developments and Priority Reform Agenda for 
Economic Growth.
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The average annual growth rate in agriculture increased significantly to 4.9 per cent 
during the First Five Year Plan period o f Bangladesh. From then onwards, the sector's 
growth rate showed signs of its decline. The growth rate declined to 1.7 per cent during 
the TFYP and the slump continued registering a 0.98 per cent growth rate during the 
FFYP (slam, 1998). Table -7 shows the inter-temporal growth rate since the 
independence of Bangladesh.
Table 4.7: Growth in Agriculture^






Source: Adapted from  the Government o f  Bangladesh (  1996)
Industrial Production
Bangladesh Bureau o f Statistics estimates o f industrial production shows a sudden bullish 
trend in the country's industrial production. The sector's growth jumped from 4.18 per 
cent in 1990/91 to 10 percent in 1991/92. The escalation continued to be 13 per cent in 
the preceeding year. The degree o f the output growth has been questioned on the face o f 
it on two counts. The sector's spokesmen were vocal about the industrial sickness and 
stagnation in investment throughout the 1990s and secondly, the growth record even 
surpassed high growth economies such as China (11.2 per cent) (Sobhan, 1996).
‘ Bureau of Statistics (1996), Ministry of Planning, Government o f Bangladesh, Dhaka
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Poverty
SAP left a serious impact on the distributional aspect and its consequences on the poor. 
Poverty and human resources were taken as add-on agenda in the SAP process. Mujeri et 
al (1993) argued that the main goal for Bangladesh should be adjustment with poverty 
reduction and not either adjustment or poverty reduction. The poverty measures show an 
increase in poverty after 1985/86.
Health System
The state of affairs in the country's dismal health sector suggests that 60 per cent of 
Bangladesh's population has access to health care. Over 90 per cent o f the children are 
malnourished, 70 per cent o f the mothers suffer from nutritional deficiency, over 70 per 
cent of the pregnant women do not receive ante-natal care while over 90 per cent o f them 
do not receive post-natal care (Barkat, 1998; Sobhan, 1998).
Environmental Impacts
We have found that the pressure to increase food production has resulted in adopting 
policies such as excessive emphasis on (rapidly) increasing yield, withdrawal o f subsidy 
and liberalization o f imports. Adherence to these policies has generally resulted in 
excessive use o f fertilizers, use o f spurious fertilizers and inefficient use o f various type 
o f fertilizers. These had serious impact on the quality of land: nutrient content in the soil
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declined and fertility o f land eroded. We have also found that the objective o f pursuing an 
export-led growth strategy has led to adoption of policies such as promotion of non- 
traditional exports, for example, shrimps. Bhattacharya et al. (1999) makes an attempt to 
incorporate environmental costs in measuring the economic costs and benefits o f shrimp 
cultivation. There are direct (land degradation, health hazards and mangrove destruction 
and so on) and indirect (loss in biodiversity, social impact and so on) costs of shrimp 
cultivation. These costs are not always immediate and therefore spread over time.
Conclusion
The failure of the Bangladesh economy to be on a sustainable growth path has been 
aggravated by a crisis of governance. The failure in following the desired growth path has 
led the independent periodic reviews to argue that it is rooted in a crisis o f governance 
rather than in a failure o f the macroeconomic policy (Sobhan, 1998). A view is gaining 
ground in civil society that the fundamental g ovemance crisis emerges from a lack o f 
ownership of the reform by the government. Lack o f ownership has impeded the 
implementation of concrete suggestions made by the donors.
The dismal outcome of the reforms, as opposed to the rosy aspirations which underlay 
them, may lead to a redirection of the reform agenda on the ground that the economy is 
caught in low-savings, low- investment, and low- growth trap. This could be a result of 
the excessive emphasis put on demand management at the neglect o f supply factors. 
Consequently, it is suspected that improvements in some key parameters are deceptive 
since they can not usher in a sustained trend.
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The new realism both at the global and country levels have reinforced the fact that there 
exists no ready-made universal solution that can be packaged together and spread 
throughout the universe. Under the impact of the ground reality, it is now felt that the 
simplistic agenda universally marketed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) and 
swallowed by governments like Bangladesh to stave off their economic problems is no 
easy solution to their peculiar crises. One might be tempted to follow a policy agenda 
which both targets and empowers the hard-working poor whilst promoting creative 
entrepreneurship. Such an agenda will also be the best investment to sustain Bangladesh's 




In the literature, each of two schools o f thought has advanced some ideas in regard to the 
role of aid on development in third world countries. The aid supportive school o f thought 
argues that foreign aid has increased literacy, improved health conditions and helped 
alleviate poverty. In addition, aid has served in crisis situations during famine or natural 
disaster or in situations o f conflict experienced by countries at war. The World Bank, the 
IMF and other multinational agencies are the best examples o f established supportive 
institutions o f foreign aid. On the other hand, the critical school o f thought argues that aid 
could be an important catalyst o f growth and development but there should be some 
changes and reform. Without changes and reforms aid is unproductive consumption only. 
However, it argues that foreign aid works as a tool of political and strategic interest to the 
benefit of donors, rather than the interests o f the recipients’ vast poor. According to this 
school of thought, aid has increased poverty, corruption and the gap between rich and 
poor. It only benefits the political and economic elite groups in society and makes the 
recipients dependent rather than self-sufficient.
Each school o f thought provides relevant evidence on aid. And each school also offers 
evidence in support of the arguments and ideas about aid and development. Thus, on the 
basis of a literature review it is not possible to draw any hard and fast conclusion.
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This thesis explores the impact of foreign aid on development. Here I discuss in general 
but focused particularly on Bangladesh on aid related conditional issues and their impact. 
As I already mentioned that foreign aid conditionalities relate to many things. Among 
them are structural adjustment programme (SAP) on which I discussed their impact on 
recipients here in my thesis. Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is theoretically one 
form of aid conditionalities or pre-condition o f aid supply for development. It is applied 
for macro-economic balanced, high production, high profit market economic reform, 
neglecting long-term local socio-political, economic and environmental impact. Most 
observers agree that foreign aid, at best, is only partially successful at promoting growth 
and reducing poverty. One reason is the poor performance of the recipient countries. The 
other reasons (documented in this paper) are the pattern of the flows o f foreign aid or in 
another word the conditional reform policies. The evidence shows that, in Bangladesh, 
the pressures from donors to increase food production has resulted in adopting policies 
such as excessive emphasis on liberalization o f imports. These policies have resulted in 
excessive and various mixed harmful fertilizers. These have a serious impact on the 
quality o f land; nutrient content in the soil is declined and fertility o f land is eroded. The 
evidence also shows that the effect of pursuing an export-led growth strategy has led to 
adoption o f policies such as promotion of non-traditional exports, for instance, shrimp 
farm. The effects o f increasing shrimp production are loss in biodiversity and increasing 
salinity o f soil. The social impact of such shrimp culture is also enormous and pathetic. In 
the article published in “The Daily Star” on Sept.2, 2003 titled “Shrimp Culture: Dollars 
or Deaths?”- Written by Abdul Bayes who is a Professor of Economics at Jahangimagar 
University, has describe that these are agricultural land that historically the people of that
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locality leaned on to meet the food security need by producing rice. In the past, when 
cultivation o f crops was the mainstay, ecological balance was maintained, indigenous 
technologies were adopted and an egalitarian approach to the preservation o f common 
properties was in evidence. But gone are those days with the advent o f shrimp cultivation. 
Unplanned growth o f the projects, absence of proper regulations and above all, lack of 
governance grievously gave way to an unsustainable development. However, as time 
passed, shrimps began to show potentials as an important source o f foreign exchange, 
accounting for, perhaps, 6 per cent of Bangladesh export earnings and about 3 per cent of 
world exports o f shrimps. At global level today, about one-third of the shrimps are 
reported to be farmed here compared to barely 5 per cent in the 1980s. This is the dollar- 
side of the development. But the dark side should never be in oblivion. Since shrimp 
culture started to surge, local conflicts crept up with grabbing of land, environmental 
degradation developed, considerable numbers of people were forced below the poverty 
line and a host o f adverse impacts were impinged thereupon. The imputed costs o f such 
hazards should be added to the revenue earnings to arrive at sustainable development of 
the sector. There are many newspaper stories and research findings about the socio­
economics and politics o f shrimp culture. In fact, if  one scans through the news and 
views relating to deteriorating law and order situation in greater Khulna one could, 
perhaps, come to the conclusion that the lion's share o f these deteriorations owe to shrimp 
cultivation and related issues.
The structural adjustment programme is designed to eliminate distortions and elementary 
economics tells us distortions create allocative and distributive inefficiency. The 
programme was aimed to stimulate growth in developing economies most o f whom
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stagnated due to effects of external and internal shocks. The basic idea is simple i.e. 
establishing a market-determined regime; this requires containment o f the role o f the state 
in production and market. The state, which was earlier identified as the organized force 
for propelling growth, was identified as the prime source of distortion manifested through 
regulation, control, protection under high tariff wall, ownership and operation o f public 
enterprises, price control, exchange control, high presence in financial sector and poor 
quality o f public expenditure. The basic thrust o f structural adjustment was deregulation, 
privatization, and liberalization for allowing the market forces to play their rightful role. 
The framers o f the policy possibly did not dream of achieving the ideal o f a perfectly 
competitive economy in product, labor and capital markets, but generally couch their 
arguments in  the language. Bangladesh implemented the structural adjustment policies 
since 1982 and enjoyed support of SAP and ESAF in this regard. Bangladesh has been 
credited for carrying out one o f the most rapid tariff liberalization and privatization 
programme as well as carrying out policy reforms in financial and fiscal sectors. It has 
devalued currency and decontrolled current account operations, it has adopted measures 
to deregulate many sectors including private investment and foreign direct investment, 
withdrawn many subsidies and price controls, reduced effective average tariff rates, 
followed on the whole a fiscal policy of budgetary deficit containment, rationalized tax 
structure, allowed monetary sector to function according to market signals and increased 
spending in social sector. It has not carried out labor market reform or a meaningful 
reform in public administration. The basic premise was that such policy adjustments and 
withdrawal o f state control will reduce costs due to transactions and inefficiency, increase 
entry into the market increasing competition, production and employment through a
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cumulative efficiency impact and this efficiency gain will increase productivity gain and 
income of faetors thus propelling the economy towards higher gross domestic product. 
Basically, Bangladesh began stepping towards free market economy since 1975 after the 
fall of socialist-oriented first new regime of the newly independent country-Bangladesh, 
though structural economic reform had appeared before on the agenda o f the International 
financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Over the last 27 years successive regimes, both military and eivilian, undertook 
wide-ranging reform polieies that led to the creation of what is often called a market- 
friendly framework for eeonomic governance. Their policies focused primarily on 
restructuring the public sector, adopting an export oriented growth strategy, strengthening 
the private sector, liberalizing the trade and exchange regimes, and establishing an 
enabling environment for economic growth.
Most studies claim that after more than a quarter century o f experiments with market 
reform, Bangladesh’s economy is still struggling to both sustain macro-economic 
stability and develop a framework for rapid economic growth.
This study finds little empirical evidence to support the widely held assumption that pro­
market reforms were undertaken in Bangladesh in order to improve either its macro- 
economic performance or to improve its poverty conditions. Successive regimes, both 
civilian and military, implemented various types of economic liberalization programmes, 
including the transfer of State Owned Enterprises(SOEs) to the private sector, reforming 
the financial sector, and liberalizing the trade and import regimes primarily to develop 
political coalitions with both external and internal key actors. In particular, the two
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military regimes of General Zia and General Ershad used économie reform programmes 
largely as a tool to both legitimize and consolidate their unconstitutional power base. 
Both of them sought to develop political alliances with senior bureaucrats, businessmen, 
and industrialists mainly through their reform measures.
This research discovers that General Zia and Ershad allowed big business to emerge as a 
major player in national decision-making, which in turn adversely affected the state’s 
ability to either enforce contracts or to develop a mechanism for redistributing assets. 
Both Generals also encouraged, the country’s financial and economic elites to accumulate 
huge wealth through the abuse o f scarce public resources. In  return, not only did  big 
business lend its political support to the military authoritarian regimes’ legitimization 
programmes, perhaps more importantly, businessmen and industrialists also contributed 
generously to the coffers o f the ruling BNP and JP, helping them to expand their political 
support base. Even under the democratically elected regimes o f both Begum Khaleda Zia 
and Sheikh Hasina, economic reforms did not appear to be a means o f improving either 
the performance of the economy or the living standards for the majority. Instead, 
economic liberalization programmes were used primarily to protect and promote the 
goals o f big business during their rules. Despite widespread optimism, these two 
democratically elected regimes did not even succeed in winning popular support in favor 
of their fast-track reform programmes. This research also finds that eeonomic reform 
programmes undertaken by both Prime ministers- Mrs.Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh 
Hasina W azed suhstantially increased the power ofbusinessm en and industrialists and
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subsequently further reduced the state’s ability to develop an effective regulatory 
framework required to stop the abuse of public resources by business elites.
On the basis o f this study we can argue that the big business elites emerged as the 
dominant political force in Bangladesh preventing the state from carrying out various 
redistribution programmes designed to reduce the sufferings o f those who are badly 
affected by the country’s transition to the market. Economic liberalization thus continued 
to frustrate the hopes of its advocates and ordinary citizens of Bangladesh. So, basically, 
the stmctural economic and political reforms (which are advised or directed by the IMF 
and the World Bank) have been introduced as the conditional tools to bail out or to 
sustain economic development in the third world countries. Unfortunately, such a reform 
has been done without proper local participation and research survey on the basis o f trail 
and error, which I have focused in the case o f Bangladesh. As a result, the adverse 
impacts of reform-conditionalities marginalized the vast poor, favouring local elites and 
globalized multinational market forces.
Here again I like to mention some specific issues, which are directly or indirectly related 
to the causes o f failure of foreign aid in Bangladesh. Governance is one o f the main 
issues in the case of Bangladesh. The pledge to stamp out crime and corruption topped 
the election manifesto of the present government o f Bangladesh. Despite the anti-crime 
drive like Operation Clean Heart, the country experienced free fall o f law and order. And, 
on Tuesday, October 7, 2003, the Transparency International (TI) rated Bangladesh as the 
most corrupt nation for the third successive year. So, it proves that in absence o f good
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governance corruption prevails which is one o f the main obstacles for development in the 
case of Bangladesh. Governance is a very crucial dynamic for human development. From 
a human development perspective, it is defined that good governance promotes, supports 
and sustains human well-being based on expanding human capabilities, choices, 
opportunities and freedom (economic and social as well as political), specially for the 
currently poorest and most marginalized members of society. In this context, governance 
can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage 
a country’s affairs at all levels. So, good governance is defined as a set of societal 
institutions that fully represent the people, interlinked by a solid network of institutional 
regulation and accountability (with ultimate accountability to the people), whose purpose 
is to  a chi eve t he welfare o f  all m embers o f  s ociety. So, the e vidence p rovided in  this 
study on the case of Bangladesh regarding corruption and irregularities o f different 
regimes is one of the governance issues, which hinder any kind o f development initiative. 
On the other hand, in spite o f bad governance the donors are funneling aid for their own 
interest. So, in  this s ense t he d onors are a Iso r esponsible for u nderdevelopment in  the 
recipient.
There are other factors that do not help foreign aid workable in the case o f Bangladesh. 
For instance, aid allocation, conditionalities o f aid, types of aid, and the political and 
strategic consideration o f aid both in recipient and donors persepctive. In the case of 
conditionalities, the donor countries impose the clauses in the aid agreement to purchase 
expensive materials or to employ the inexperienced experts with high salary to the 
recipient. So, not a single reason is responsible for the negative impact o f aid on national
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development; rather all o f above-mentioned factors particularly more or less are 
combinedly responsible for the ineffective aid situation in Bangladesh.
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